Nixon as President: “Vietnamizing” the War 783former attorney general Robert F. Kennedy, brother of
the slain president, to declare his candidacy for the
Democratic nomination. Like McCarthy, Kennedy
opposed Johnson’s Vietnam policies but thought his
chances of winning were better than McCarthy’s.
Confronting this division in the ranks, President
Johnson realized he could no longer hope to be an
effective president. In a surprising televised announce-
ment, he withdrew from the race. Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey then announced his candidacy,
and Johnson threw the weight of his administration
behind him.
Kennedy carried several primaries, including
California. Immediately after his victory speech in a Los
Angeles hotel, however, he was assassinated by Sirhan
Sirhan, an Arab nationalist who had been incensed by
Kennedy’s support of Israel. In effect, Kennedy’s death
ensured the nomination of Humphrey.
The contest for the Republican nomination was
far less dramatic, although its outcome, the nomina-
tion of Richard M. Nixon, would have been hard to
predict a few years earlier. After his loss to Kennedy in
1960, Nixon ran unsuccessfully for governor of
California in 1962, then moved to New York City
and joined a prominent law firm. But he remained
active in Republican affairs. In 1964 he had cam-
paigned hard for Goldwater. When no other
Republican developed extensive support as the 1968
election approached, Nixon entered the race, swept
the primaries, and won an easy first-ballot victory at
the Republican convention.
Nixon then astounded the country and dismayed
liberals by choosing Governor Spiro T. Agnew of
Maryland as his running mate. Agnew was a political
unknown. (“Spiro who?” jokesters asked.) Nixon
chose him primarily to attract southern votes.
Placating the South seemed necessary because
Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama was making
a determined bid to win enough electoral votes for his
American Independent party to prevent any candidate
from obtaining a majority. Wallace was flagrantly anti-
black and anti-intellectual. (College professors were
among his favorite targets. In attacking them he used
such well-worn images as “ivory tower folks with
pointed heads” and—more inventive—people with-
out “sense enough to park a bicycle straight.”) He
denounced federal “meddling,” the “coddling” of
criminals, and the forced integration of schools.
This Republican strategy to win the South height-
ened the tension surrounding the Democratic conven-
tion, which met in Chicago in late August. Humphrey
delegates controlled the convention. Several thousand
activists, representing a dozen groups and advocating
tactics ranging from orderly demonstrations to civil
disobedience to indiscriminate violence, descended on
Chicago to put pressure on the delegates to repudiate
the Johnson Vietnam policy.
In the tense atmosphere that resulted, the party
hierarchy overreacted. The mayor of Chicago,
Richard J. Daley, whose ability to “influence” elec-
tion results in a manner favorable to Democrats
had often been demonstrated, ringed the conven-
tion with policemen to protect it from disruption.
This was a reasonable precaution in itself. Inside
the building the delegates nominated Humphrey
and adopted a war plank satisfactory to Johnson.
Outside, however, provoked by the abusive lan-
guage and violent behavior of radical demonstra-
tors, the police tore into the protesters, in novelist
Norman Mailer’s graphic phrase, “like a chain saw
cutting into wood,” while millions watched on
television in fascinated horror.
The mayhem in Chicago seemed to benefit
Nixon by strengthening the convictions of many vot-
ers that the tougher treatment of criminals and dis-
senters that he and Agnew were calling for was
necessary. Those who were critical of the Chicago
police tended to blame Humphrey, whom Mayor
Daley supported.
Nixon campaigned at a deliberate, dignified
pace. He made relatively few public appearances,
relying instead on carefully arranged television inter-
views and taped commercials. He stressed firm
enforcement of the law and his desire “to bring us
together.” As for Vietnam, he would “end the war
and win the peace,” by just what means he did not
say. Agnew, in his blunt, coarse way, assaulted
Humphrey, the Democrats, and left-wing dissident
groups. (Critics who remembered Nixon’s own com-
bative style in the era of Joseph McCarthy called
Agnew “Nixon’s Nixon.”)
But gradually Humphrey gained ground, and on
election day the popular vote was close: Nixon slightly
less than 31.8 million, Humphrey nearly 31.3 million.
Nixon’s Electoral College margin, however, was
substantial—301 to 191. The remaining 46 electoral
votes went to Wallace, whose 9.9 million votes came
to 13.5 percent of the total. Together, Nixon and
Wallace received 57 percent of the popular vote.Nixon as President: “Vietnamizing” the War
When he took office in January 1969, Richard Nixon
projected an image of calm and deliberate statesman-
ship; he introduced no startling changes, proposed no
important new legislation. Indeed, he accepted more
or less uncritically the New Deal approach to managing