THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AMERICA 165
Despite the imminent threat of a Spanish invasion,
the provinces quarreled with each other and de-
fi ed the authority of the weak central government.
Having determined that the situation was hope-
less, Bolívar left in May 1815 for the British island
of Jamaica. Meanwhile, a strong Spanish army un-
der General Pablo Morillo had landed in Venezuela,
completed the reconquest of the colony, and then
sailed to lay siege to Cartagena. Cut off by land and
sea, the city surrendered in December, and the rest
of Colombia was pacifi ed within a few months. Of
all the provinces of Spanish America, only Argen-
tina remained in revolt. Had Ferdinand made the
concession of granting legal equality with whites
to the mixed-bloods who supported his cause, the
Spanish Empire in America might have survived
much longer. But the reactionary Ferdinand would
make no concessions.
Bolívar still had an unshakable faith in the in-
evitable triumph of independence. From Jamaica
he sent a famous letter in which he affi rmed that
faith and offered a remarkable analysis of the situ-
ation and prospects of Spanish America. He scoffed
at the ability of Spain—that “aged serpent”—to
maintain Spanish America forever in subjection.
Bolívar also looked into the political future of the
continent. Monarchy, he argued, was foreign to the
genius of Latin America; only a republican regime
would be accepted by its peoples. A single govern-
ment for the region was impracticable, divided as
it was by “climatic differences, geographic diver-
sity, confl icting interests, and dissimilar charac-
teristics.” Bolívar boldly forecast the destiny of the
different regions, taking account of their economic
and social structures. Chile, for example, seemed
to him to have a democratic future, whereas Peru
was fated to suffer dictatorship because it contained
“two factors that clash with every just and liberal
principle: gold and slaves.”
From Jamaica, Bolívar went to Haiti, where he
received a sympathetic hearing and the offer of some
material support from the mulatto president Alex-
andre Pétion, who asked in return for the freedom
of the slaves in the territory that Bolívar should lib-
erate. In March 1816, Bolívar and a small band of
followers landed on the island of Margarita off the
Venezuelan coast. Two attempts to gain a foothold
on the mainland were easily beaten back, and soon
Bolívar was back in the West Indies. Refl ecting on
his failures, he concluded that the effort to invade
the well-fortifi ed western coast of Venezuela was a
mistake and decided to establish a base in the Ori-
noco River valley, far from the centers of Spanish
power. Roving patriot bands still operated in this
region, and Bolívar hoped to win the allegiance of
the llaneros, who were becoming disillusioned with
their Spanish allies. In September 1816, Bolívar
sailed from Haiti for the Orinoco River delta, which
he ascended until he reached the small town of An-
gostura (modern Ciudad Bolívar), which he made
his headquarters.
The tide of war now began to fl ow in his favor.
The patriot guerrilla bands accepted his leadership.
Even more important, he gained the support of the
principal llanero chieftain, José Antonio Páez. Eu-
ropean developments also favored Bolívar. The end
of the Napoleonic wars idled a large number of Brit-
ish soldiers; many of these veterans came to Ven-
ezuela, forming a British Legion that distinguished
itself in battle by its valor. English merchants made
loans that enabled Bolívar to secure men and arms
for the coming campaign. Helpful too was the
mulish attitude of Ferdinand VII, whose refusal to
consider making any concessions to the colonists
caused the English government to lose patience
and regard with more friendly eyes the prospect of
Spanish American independence.
On the eve of the decisive campaign of 1819,
Bolívar summoned to Angostura a makeshift con-
gress that vested him with dictatorial powers. To
this congress he presented a project for a constitu-
tion for Venezuela in which he urged the abolition
of slavery and the distribution of land to revolu-
tionary soldiers. But the proposed constitution also
had some nondemocratic features. They included a
president with virtually royal powers, a hereditary
senate, and restriction of the suffrage and offi ce-
holding to the propertied and educated elite. The
congress disregarded Bolívar’s reform proposals
but elected him president of the republic and
adopted a constitution that embodied many of his
ideas.
The war, however, still had to be won. Bolívar’s
bold strategy for the liberation of Venezuela and