168 CHAPTER 8 THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA
and the United States and engaged a competent
though eccentric naval offi cer, Thomas, Lord
Cochrane, to organize the patriot navy. In August
1820 the expedition sailed for Peru in a fl eet made
up of seven ships of war and eighteen transports.
San Martín landed his army about a hundred miles
south of Lima but delayed moving on the Peru-
vian capital. He hoped to obtain its surrender by
economic blockade, propaganda, and direct ne-
gotiation with the Spanish offi cials. The desire of
the Lima aristocracy, creole and peninsular, to
avoid an armed struggle that might unleash an in-
digenous and slave revolt worked in favor of San
Martín’s strategy. In June 1821 the Spanish army
evacuated Lima and retreated toward the Andes.
San Martín entered the capital and in a festive at-
mosphere proclaimed the independence of Peru.
But his victory was far from complete. He had
to deal with counterrevolutionary plots and the
resistance of Lima’s corrupt elite to his program of
social reform, which included ending indigenous
tribute and granting freedom to the children of
slaves. San Martín’s assumption of supreme mili-
tary and civil power in August 1821 added to the
factional opposition. Meanwhile, a large Spanish
army maneuvered in front of Lima, challenging
San Martín to a battle he dared not join with his
much smaller force. Disheartened by the atmo-
sphere of intrigue and hostility that surrounded
him, San Martín became convinced that only mon-
archy could bring stability to Spanish America,
and he sent a secret mission to Europe to search for
a prince for the throne of Peru.
Such was the background of San Martín’s
departure for Guayaquil, where he met in confer-
ence with Bolívar on July 26 and 27, 1822. The
agenda of the meeting included several points. One
concerned the future of Guayaquil. San Martín
claimed the port city for Peru; Bolívar, however,
had already annexed it to Gran Colombia, con-
fronting San Martín with a fait accompli. Another
topic was the political future of all Spanish Amer-
ica. San Martín favored monarchy as the solution
for the emergent chaos of the new states; Bolívar
believed in a governmental system that would be
republican in form and oligarchical in content. But
the critical question before the two men was how
to complete the liberation of the continent by de-
feating the Spanish forces in Peru.
San Martín’s abrupt retirement from public
life after the conference, the reluctance of the two
liberators to discuss what was said there, and the
meager authentic documentary record of the pro-
ceedings have surrounded the meeting with an
atmosphere of mystery and produced two opposed
and partisan interpretations. A view favored by
Argentine historians holds that San Martín came
to Guayaquil in search of military aid but was re-
buffed by Bolívar, who was unwilling to share with
a rival the glory of bringing the struggle for inde-
pendence to an end. San Martín then magnani-
mously decided to leave Peru and allow Bolívar
to complete the work he had begun. Venezuelan
historians, on the other hand, argue that San Mar-
tín came to Guayaquil primarily to recover Guaya-
quil for Peru. The historians deny that San Martín
asked Bolívar for more troops and insist that he left
Peru for personal reasons that had nothing to do
with the conference.
Both interpretations tend to diminish the
stature and sense of realism of the two liberators.
San Martín was no martyr, nor was Bolívar an
ambitious schemer who sacrifi ced San Martín to
his passion for power and glory. San Martín must
have understood that Bolívar alone combined the
military, political, and psychological assets needed
to liquidate the factional hornets’ nest in Peru and
gain fi nal victory over the powerful Spanish army
in the sierra. Given the situation in Lima, San
Martín’s presence there could only hinder the per-
formance of those tasks. In this light, the decision
of Bolívar to assume sole direction of the war and
of San Martín to withdraw refl ected a realistic ap-
praisal of the Peruvian problem and the solution it
required.
San Martín returned to Lima to fi nd that in
his absence his enemies had rallied and struck at
him by driving his reforming chief minister, Ber-
nardo Monteagudo, out of the country. San Martín
made no effort to reassert his power. In September
1822, before the fi rst Peruvian congress, he an-
nounced his resignation as protector and his im-
pending departure. He returned to Buenos Aires by
way of Chile, where the government of his friend