170 CHAPTER 8 THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA
with the court and who competed with Brazilians
for jobs and favors. Portuguese merchants in Bra-
zil, for their part, were bitter over the passing of the
Lisbon monopoly. Thus, the change in the status
of Brazil sharpened the confl ict between mazom-
bos (Portuguese elites born in Brazil) and reinóis
(elites born in Portugal and loyal to the Portuguese
crown).
The event that precipitated the break with
the mother country was the revolution of 1820 in
Portugal. The Portuguese revolutionists framed a
liberal constitution for the kingdom, but they were
conservative or reactionary in relation to Brazil.
They demanded the immediate return of Dom João
to Lisbon, an end to the system of dual monarchy
that he had devised, and the restoration of the Por-
tuguese commercial monopoly. Timid and vacil-
lating, Dom João did not know which way to turn.
Under the pressure of his courtiers, who hungered
to return to Portugal and their lost estates, he fi -
nally approved the new constitution and sailed for
Portugal. He left behind him, however, his son and
heir, Dom Pedro, as regent of Brazil, and in a pri-
vate letter advised him, in the event the Brazilians
should demand independence, to assume leader-
ship of the movement and set the crown of Brazil on
his head. Pedro received the same advice from José
Bonifácio de Andrada, a Brazilian scientist whose
stay in Portugal had completely disillusioned him
about the Portuguese capacity for colonial reform.
Soon it became clear that the Portuguese
Côrtes intended to set the clock back by abrogating
all the liberties and concessions won by Brazil since
- One of its decrees insisted on the immedi-
ate return of Dom Pedro from Brazil to complete
his political education. The pace of events moved
more rapidly in 1822. On January 9, Dom Pedro,
urged on by José Bonifácio de Andrada and other
Brazilian advisers who perceived a golden opportu-
nity to make an orderly transition to independence
without the intervention of the masses, refused an
order from the Côrtes to return to Portugal and is-
sued his famous fi co (“I remain”). On September 7,
regarded by all Brazilians as Independence Day, he
issued the even more celebrated Cry of Ipiranga:
“Independence or Death!” In December 1822,
having overcome slight resistance by Portuguese
troops, Dom Pedro was formally proclaimed con-
stitutional emperor of Brazil.
Mexico’s Road to Independence
In New Spain, as in other colonies, the crisis of the
Bourbon monarchy in 1808–1810 encouraged
some creole leaders to strike a blow for self-rule
or total independence under “the mask of Ferdi-
nand.” But in Mexico the movement for indepen-
dence took an unexpected turn, revealing stark
differences between those who struggled merely for
home rule against Spain and those who fought to
rule at home. Here the masses, instead of remain-
ing aloof, joined the struggle and for a time man-
aged to convert it from a private quarrel between
two elites into an incipient social revolution.
In July 1808 news of Napoleon’s capture of
Charles IV and Ferdinand VII and his invasion of
Spain reached Mexico City and provoked intense
debates and maneuvers among Mexican elites to
take advantage of these dramatic events. Faced
with the prospect of an imminent collapse of Spain,
creoles and peninsulars alike prepared to seize
power and ensure that their group would control
New Spain, whatever the outcome of the Spanish
crisis. The creoles moved fi rst. The Mexico City ca-
bildo, a creole stronghold, called on the viceroy to
summon an assembly to be chosen by the creole-
dominated cabildos. This assembly, composed of
representatives of various elite groups, would gov-
ern Mexico until Ferdinand VII, whose forced abdi-
cation was null and void, regained his throne. The
viceroy, José de Iturrigaray, supported such a call,
noting that Spain was in “a state of anarchy.”
The conservative landed elite that sponsored
the movement for a colonial assembly, it must be
stressed, desired free trade and autonomy or home
rule within the Spanish empire, not independence.
They had no intention of taking up arms in a strug-
gle that might bring a dangerous intervention of
the exploited classes and thus endanger their own
personal and economic survival. The reforms that
the chief creole ideologist Fray Melchor de Tala-
mantes recommended to the proposed assembly
suggested the limits of creole elite ambitions: abo-
lition of the Inquisition and the ecclesiastical fuero