MEXICAN POLITICS AND ECONOMY 247
the neocolonial order and depended on it for their
livelihood; therefore, as a rule they did not question
its viability. The small nationalist, socialist, anar-
chist, and syndicalist groups that arose in various
Latin American countries in the 1890s challenged
capitalism, neocolonialism, and the liberal state,
but the full signifi cance of these movements lay in
the future.
The trends just described lend a certain unity
to the history of Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bra-
zil, Central America, Venezuela, and Colombia in
the period from 1870 to 1914. Each, however,
presents signifi cant variations on the common
theme—variations that refl ect distinctive histori-
cal backgrounds and conditions.
Mexican Politics and Economy
DICTATORSHIP UNDER DÍAZ
General Porfi rio Díaz seized power in 1876 with the
support of disgruntled regional caudillos and mili-
tary personnel, liberals angered by the old regime’s
patronage politics, and indigenous and mestizo
small landholders who believed that Díaz would
protect them. He also owed his success to the open
support of American capitalists, army command-
ers, and great Texas landowners who, regarding
his predecessor as “anti-American,” supplied Díaz
with arms and cash. Thereafter, Díaz erected the
Porfi riato, one of the longest personal dictatorships
in Latin American history.
But the construction of the dictatorship was a
gradual process. During his fi rst presidential term,
Congress and the judiciary enjoyed a certain inde-
pendence, and the press, including a vocal radical
labor press, was free. The outlines of Díaz’s eco-
nomic and social policies, however, soon became
clear. Confronted with an empty treasury, facing
pressures from above and below, Díaz decided in
favor of the great landowners, moneylenders, and
foreign capitalists, whose assistance could ensure
his political survival. In return, he assured these
groups that their property and other interests would
be protected. Díaz, who had once proclaimed that
in the age-old struggle between the people and the
haciendas, he was fi rmly on the side of the people,
now sent troops to suppress peasant resistance to
land seizures. And although before taking power,
he had denounced generous concessions to British
capitalists, by 1880, Díaz had granted even more
lavish subsidies for railway construction to North
American companies. Economic growth had be-
come for Díaz the great object, the key to the solu-
tion of his own problems and those of the nation.
Economic growth required political stability;
accordingly, Díaz promoted a policy of concilia-
tion, described by the formula pan o palo (bread or
the club). This consisted of offering an olive branch
and a share of spoils to all infl uential opponents,
no matter what their political past or persuasion.
A dog with a bone in its mouth, Díaz cynically ob-
served, neither kills nor steals. In effect, Díaz invited
all sections of the upper class and some members of
the middle class, including prominent intellectuals
and journalists, to join the great Mexican barbecue,
from which only the poor and humble were barred.
Opponents who refused Díaz’s bribes—political of-
fi ces, monopolies, and the like—suffered swift re-
prisal. Dissidents were beaten up, murdered, or
arrested and sent to the damp underground dun-
geons of San Juan de Ulúa or the grim Belén prison,
a sort of Mexican Bastille. An important instru-
ment of this policy was a force of mounted police,
therurales, originally composed of former bandits
and vagrants who later were gradually replaced by
artisan and peasant recruits dislocated by the large
social changes that took place during the Porfi ri-
ato. Aside from chasing unrepentant bandits, the
major function of the rurales was to suppress peas-
ant unrest and break strikes.
By such means, Díaz virtually eliminated all ef-
fective opposition. The 1857 constitution and the
liberties it guaranteed existed only on paper. Elec-
tions to Congress, in theory the highest organ of
government, were a farce; Díaz simply circulated
a list of his candidates to local offi cials, who certi-
fi ed their election. The dictator contemptuously
called Congress his caballada, his stable of horses.
The state governors were appointed by Díaz, usu-
ally from the ranks of local great landlords or his
generals. In return for their loyalty, he gave them
a free hand to enrich themselves and terrorize the
local population. Under them were district heads