1032 Cm. 2 5 • Economic Depression and Dictatorshipideology as well as France as an enemy. The Duce had proclaimed in 1933,
the year Hitler came to power, “Hitler’s victory is also our victory.”
Mussolini had reduced Albania, the small, impoverished nation across
the Adriatic, to a virtual Italian protectorate, although it had almost no
Italian population. In the South Tyrol, absorbed by Italy under the terms
of the post-war settlement, Mussolini ordered a policy of Italianization, for
bidding the use of the German and Slovene languages in schools. Somalia,
the country at the horn of Africa that Italy had conquered before the war,
turned into a military base from which new conquests could be launched.
Italian troops burned villages and slaughtered their inhabitants. In Libya,
Italian forces routinely ordered the use of mustard gas and public hangings
to solidify their control.
Mussolini worked to increase international tensions in the hope of tak
ing advantage of instability. The Duce had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact
in 1928, in which the major powers renounced war as an instrument of
national policy, not because he believed in its principles, but because he
wanted Britain and France to treat Italy as a great power. Meanwhile, Italy
funneled secret arms to Germany and trained German pilots in violation of
post-war treaties. In the Balkans, Italian agents provided financial support
to right-wing terrorist groups, including ethnic Hungarians and Croats
plotting against the Yugoslav government.
Hitler s plan to absorb Austria required Italian support, or at least neutral
ity, until Germany had been fully rearmed. But for the moment, Germany
was still in no position to antagonize France. However, the German dictator
took a calculated risk in 1934. Dictator Dollfuss shared much with the
Nazis, but intended to maintain Austrian independence and had banned the
Austrian Nazi Party, which was funded by German Nazis. He had also signed
alliances with Italy and Hungary. Austrian Nazis, backed by Hitler, assassi
nated Dollfuss during their badly organized coup attempt. The steely Kurt
von Schuschnigg (1897-1977) replaced Dollfuss as leader of an authoritar
ian government. Schuschnigg, like his predecessor, believed he could main
tain right-wing rule in Austria without German help. The dual allegiances to
Austrian independence and to an institutional role for the Catholic Church
separated Austria’s authoritarian regime from its German counterpart.
Hitler correctly assessed that it was unlikely that Britain, France, and
Italy—Mussolini was absorbed by planning an invasion of Ethiopia in East
Africa—would mount an effective, concerted response to blatant German
moves to overthrow the Austrian government. Each government limited
itself to a protest against German meddling in Austrian internal politics,
asserting its interest in Austria’s independence. The British government
was convinced that conciliatory moves toward Germany might keep Hitler
in line, particularly if, as a good many British conservatives believed, Hitler
wanted no more than to be recognized as a power and to be able to defend
Germany’s borders. The French government did no more than express irri
tation, as it was confronting a fascist threat at home.