The Coming of World War II^1055

Neville Chamberlain promises “peace in our time” after his return from Munich in

September 1938.

which had completed a line of bunker-like fortifications—the Maginot
Line—to the Belgian frontier and counted on Belgium’s ability to defend
against a German attack, was now more exposed to a German onslaught.
The French government also feared that Hitler might convince Franco of
Spain to join Germany in a war against republican France from the other
side of the Pyrenees.
The appeasement of Hitler at Munich provided the German army with
more time to prepare for the conquest of what remained of Czechoslovakia.
Appeasement—the term would subsequently take on a negative sense—had
already characterized both British and French foreign policy in dealing with
Mussolini (as the Ethiopian invasion demonstrated). Appeasement as for­
eign policy was influenced by the sheer horror of the Great War and many
Europeans’ unwillingness to contemplate a new conflict. Appeasement did
not mean peace at any price, but rather the belief that if Germany could be
appeased on one or two demands, then Hitler would be satisfied, or so the
reasoning went, and Europe would be safe from war. It was pure delusion.
On March 16, 1939, Hitler shattered the Munich agreements. German
troops marched across the Czech border and occupied Prague. Again, as
in the case of Austria, the British government helped Hitler out by allowing
the transfer of 6 million pounds of Czech gold deposits from London banks
to the German-occupied state. Germany strengthened its forces with the
addition of the Czech air force and army, and it no longer had to maintain
strong defenses on its southern border. Hitler’s brazen move shocked Mus­
solini, who complained, “Each time Hitler occupies a country, he sends me
a message.” In April 1939, Italian troops invaded and annexed Albania.
British factories began turning out fighter planes as quickly as possible.