498 Ch. 13 • Napoleon and Europe

was nothing more than a “bauble.” Napoleon replied, “You may call them
baubles, but it is by baubles that mankind is governed.” The subjects of terri­
tories incorporated into the empire were eligible to receive the Legion of
Honor. When Rome became part of Napoleon’s immense empire, the follow­
ing parody on the Legion of Honor appeared on the walls of the Eternal

City:

In fierce old times, they balanced loss

By hanging thieves upon a cross.

But our more humane age believes

In hanging crosses on the thieves.

The Tide Turns against Napoleon

French rule generated resistance in countries absorbed into Napoleon’s

empire through conquest. Napoleon manipulated factional splits in some

countries, co-opted local elites where he could, brushed aside rulers as he

pleased, and tried to establish compliant new regimes, some handed over to

his brothers. But ultimately French rule over such an extended empire col­

lapsed. Napoleon’s failure to force British submission by strangling its econ­

omy with his “Continental System,” which aimed to cut off Britain from its

continental markets, kept his major enemy in the field, or more appropri­

ately, on the high seas. In Spain, resistance against French rule became a

full-fledged rebellion (the Peninsular War) that, with British assistance,

sapped imperial resources. Moreover, French occupation of some of the Ger­

man states gave rise to German nationalism, solidifying resistance. Prussian

and Austrian military reforms led to stronger opponents in the field. And in a

final ill-considered expansion of imperial aggression, Napoleon in 1812

decided to invade Russia. The destruction of his “Grand Army” in the snow­

drifts and howling winds of Russia was the beginning of the end.

The Continental System

Knowing that the war was costing the British government huge sums

(between 60 and 90 percent of the state’s annual revenue), in November

1806 Napoleon announced his Continental System. It prohibited trade with

Britain, which he hoped would strangle the British economy by closing all

continental ports to British ships. French merchants and manufacturers, as

well as the state, would earn fortunes supplying the captive markets of the

continent. Increased hardship might even cause damaging unrest in Britain.

But the blockade of the continental ports was far easier said than done.

The continental coastline is enormous, the British navy was strong (despite

the loss of 317 ships between 1803 and 1815), and the merchants and

smugglers resourceful. British merchants continued to find American mar­