The Great Powers and the Arab World • 313
wanted Nasir stopped before he could undermine the West's position
throughout the Arab world. France, too, wanted to stop Nasir, for Egypt
was backing, with words and weapons, the Algerian revolution. Both
Britain and France got most of their oil from tankers that passed through
the canal; the two countries were sure the Egyptians could not manage it.
Though many Americans disliked Nasir for his hostility to Israel and his
ties with communist states, neither President Dwight Eisenhower nor Sec¬
retary of State Dulles sought a military showdown. Eisenhower was then
seeking reelection on a slogan of "peace and prosperity." This was no time
for a Suez war.
The Suez Affair
Britain and France disagreed with the US. They prepared openly to retake
the canal by force, despite logistical problems that kept delaying the date
of their attack. Israel, eager to destroy the fidaiyin bases in Gaza and to
break Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, mobilized for a pre-planned
strike against Egypt. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council debated mea¬
sures to head off trouble. Egypt, which was running the canal more effi¬
ciently than anyone had expected, spurned proposals for international
control and treated those military preparations as a big bluff.
They were not. On 28 October 1956, Israel called up its reserves, thereby
doubling the number of its citizens under arms, and invaded Egypt the fol¬
lowing day. As the attackers cut off Gaza and drove into Sinai, Britain and
France issued an ultimatum to both countries, calling for an immediate
cease-fire and for troop withdrawals to positions 10 miles (16 kilometers)
from the Suez Canal. As Israel's forces were still in the eastern Sinai at the
time, this ultimatum was really directed against Egypt. When Nasir rejected
it, Britain and France bombarded Egypt's air bases, landed paratroops at
Port Said, and occupied the northern half of the canal. Soviet arms did not
enable Nasir's army to defend Egypt against what Egyptians called the "tri¬
partite aggression." Soon Israel occupied all of Sinai, and only a heroic but
futile civilian resistance delayed the British capture of Port Said.
But Nasir was not overthrown by either his army or his people. Instead,
his military defeat became a political victory. The US joined the USSR in
condemning the attack in the UN. The General Assembly agreed to set up a
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to occupy Egyptian lands taken
by the invaders. Britain and France did not get to keep the canal, Nasir was
not discredited in the eyes of Egyptians or other Arabs, and Israel could not
obtain recognition and peace from the Arabs, even after a four-month