The Iranian Revolution ••• 377rewritten, political prisons emptied (soon they would be refilled), and
agents of the old regime tried and executed. When Westerners deplored
these often violent acts, Iranians asked why the shah's government had
committed worse atrocities without being scolded by the Western media.
Tehran's new regime was soon challenged by nationalist revolts—Turks in
Azerbaijan, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Khurasani Turcomans—all seek¬
ing greater autonomy. It was the old story of Iran's regional and ethnic
forces battling against the central government in a time of crisis. The revo¬
lutionary regime had to restore the army and the secret police—even
some of the shah's personnel—to protect itself. Under the new constitu¬
tion, legislative authority would be vested in a Majlis dominated by ulama.
In contested cases, verdicts would be made by Khomeini, as the state's
leading faqih (judicial expert). But in the summer and fall of 1979 the
ulama did not yet have full control; Premier Bazargan and other moder¬
ates were trying to maintain some ties to the West, and both the left-wing
revolutionary committees and the remaining right-wing generals posed
potential threats to the regime.
The Hostage Crisis
The revolution shook US-Iranian relations. It exposed the weakness of
Washington's Middle East policy, which was predicated on a stable, pro-
Western regime in Tehran. Despite their cautious peace feelers, each side
distrusted the other. Carter had just brought Egypt and Israel together to
sign their peace treaty, arousing widespread Muslim (not just Arab) anger
against Sadat. Iranians seized Israel's embassy in Tehran and gave it to the
PLO, and the new regime invited Arafat to Iran. In February 1979 mili¬
tants broke into the US Embassy, but the government promptly drove
them out. Iranians anxiously watched the deposed shah's movements, re¬
calling how he had fled at the height of Mosaddiq's power in 1953, only to
return following the CIA-backed army coup. Would history repeat itself?
The shah moved from Egypt to Morocco to the Caribbean to Mexico as
his health grew worse. Would he be admitted into the US? The Carter ad¬
ministration, concerned about Americans still in Iran, hoped the shah
would stay away. In October, though, his doctors advised him to go to New
York for specialized treatment. Pressured by the shah's friends (among
them Kissinger), the US government let him in.
Iran's response to this provocation came from a group of women stu¬
dents, followed by armed men, who broke into the US Embassy com¬
pound (whose marine guards had been ordered not to resist) and took
sixty-three Americans hostage. They demanded that the US send the shah