A Concise History of the Middle East

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384 • 19 THE REASSERTION OF ISLAMIC POWER

shipping oil through the Gulf, and to weaken the economies of all oil-
exporting states in the region. Both Iran and Iraq attacked oil tankers, not
only each other's but those of neutral countries as well. The US govern¬
ment reflagged some Kuwaiti vessels, and its navy escorted them past Iran¬
ian mines and speedboats. By 1988 Iran could no longer buy enough arms
or spare parts. Iraq was using mustard gas and other chemical weapons
against Iran and its Kurdish allies (who were Iraqi citizens). When a US
naval ship shot down an Iranian passenger plane and the chorus of protest
was curiously muted, Tehran realized that it had few friends left in the
world. Nearly bankrupt, Iran accepted a 1987 Security Council resolution
calling for a cease-fire. The fighting ended in August 1988.

THE RETREAT FROM CAMP DAVID

After having been enemies for thirty years and having fought five wars
against each other, Egypt and Israel agreed in 1977-1978 to make peace be¬
cause both needed a respite from fighting—or so they thought at that time.
The protracted arms race and the destructiveness of their wars had impov¬
erished Egypt and turned Israel into a fortress state. The prospect of an end
to this cycle of war and rearmament encouraged both Egyptians and Is¬
raelis. The terms of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Carter adminis¬
tration's greatest achievement, seemed to meet each side's basic needs: the
phased restoration to Egypt of the Sinai Peninsula (taken by Israel in 1967);
guarantees, backed by a multinational force that included Americans, that
neither side would mass its troops to attack the other; mutual diplomatic
recognition; and facilitation of trade, tourism, cultural exchanges, commu¬
nications, and technical aid. The US would assist ongoing talks between
Israel and Egypt—plus, if possible, Jordan and the Palestinians—to arrange
full autonomy for those Palestinians under Israeli administration. How¬
ever, the promise of Palestinian autonomy was soon undermined by the ac¬
tions of the Begin government.
Signing the peace treaty with Israel exposed Sadat to the wrath of the
other Arab countries, but he contemptuously ignored their blandishments
and parried their insults, even when the oil-rich countries cut off aid to
Egypt. The Egyptian people did not like to abandon the Arab states to back
Israel, but some were also tired of being the blood bank for every Arab war
against the Jewish state. The Palestinians, so the saying went in Cairo,
would go on fighting against Israel—to their last Egyptian soldier! If the
Arabs had really wanted to humble Egypt, discredit Sadat, and derail the
Camp David Accords, they could have sent home the million Egyptian

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