The Contest for Palestine (Redux) • 439both sides, giving the extremists the upper hand. Professor Davidson be¬
lieves the main problem is that Israel's leaders have a greater desire to hold
lands (primarily the West Bank) than to attain a lasting and equitable
peace. What the Israel government does on the ground counts for more
than what it says; its actions—not its promises—reveal its goals. As we de¬
scribe the breakdown of the peace process, we, as authors, will frankly
state the points where we differ with each other and clarify the reasons for
our differences. A teacher should not tell you what to think, but rather
show you how to think. The same rule should apply to writers of text¬
books. You will be the judge.
Breakdown of the "Peace Process"
The concept of a peace process is elusive. Conflicts may be overt and vio¬
lent or covert and subtle. They may involve physical fighting or just verbal
argument. Some are resolved by mediation, arbitration, or patient diplo¬
macy. But resolution does not occur unless all the parties in some degree
seek surcease from the conflict and are willing to make some sacrifices.
They must also expect to benefit from its resolution. If making peace is to
occur in phases, as between Egypt and Israel over the period from 1977
to 1982, both parties need to see benefits from each phase and expect that
these benefits will continue. If negotiations are conducted publicly by
heads of state or government, all parties must prepare with quiet parlays
by lower-level diplomats who know the contestants' needs and can pro¬
pose compromises that do not jeopardize national security.
During the Clinton administration, the US government played a major
role in the talks between Israel and the Arab governments, including the
Palestine Authority led by Yasir Arafat. US-brokered negotiations, which
may be viewed as partial successes, included the peace treaty between Jordan
and Israel in 1995 and the 1997 Hebron agreement between Israel and the
Palestine Authority. The Oslo I and II Accords are debatable. Goldschmidt
feels that they were progressive steps frustrated by later events. Davidson
sees them as inherently flawed. They postponed for "final status" talks sub¬
jects that needed immediate treatment. They were doomed from the start
because the US refused to pressure Israel when, just after the accords were
signed, that country proceeded to expand its established settlements in the
occupied territories. Goldschmidt would add that both sides committed ter¬
rorist acts against civilians of the other side.
Failures included the Syrian-Israeli talks that broke down in 1998 over the
definition of their future border and, most conspicuously, the Camp David
Summit between Yasir Arafat and Ehud Barak, hosted by Bill Clinton, in July