The Contest for Palestine (Redux) • 445ters to a politically appointed supervisory committee, the intended target
being pro-Arab teachers.
Arab governments have vocally (but not militarily) supported the Pales¬
tinian resistance and attacked the repressive aspects of American and Israeli
policies. They have not effectively used their control of oil to influence
American and European policies and behavior. An important step was
taken by Saudi Arabia, when it proposed in an Arab League meeting in
March 2002 a comprehensive plan that would have offered Israel peace and
diplomatic recognition in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from the lands
in captured in 1967. Israel ignored it, raising questions about its real desire
for peace. Commercial ties do exist between Israel and some North African
countries, but the tentative involvement of the Israelis with Qatar has van¬
ished. Diplomatic relations remain between Israel and Egypt, but they are
frosty; those between Israel and Jordan are warmer at the governmental,
but not the popular, level. Arabs generally believe that Israel is training
Americans to interrogate, torture, and torment Iraqi prisoners. Israel sup¬
ports the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and is deeply (but secretly) involved in
the Iraq War. Israelis see Iran as a growing factor in the struggle and are
alarmed by its nuclear program and the growing range and accuracy of its
missiles. The conflict is increasingly a Muslim-Jewish one, with potential
dangers for people in parts of the world hitherto uninvolved in what used
to be the Arab-Israeli conflict. A conflict of religions is apt to be more emo¬
tional and harder to resolve than a clash of nationalisms.
Davidson argues that the vast majority of the Palestinians want an inde¬
pendent and viable state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They are will¬
ing give up their claim to 78 percent of their historic homeland. Should
they have to haggle over the remaining 22 percent? The Israelis claim to
seek recognition by their Arab neighbors and security for their people. Yet
their tenacious clinging to the occupied territories (arguably the main
source of their insecurity), their ongoing colonization of this land, and
their parallel destruction of Palestinian civil society suggest that their true
goal is a "greater Israel" rather than a peaceful and secure Israel. A policy
based on fear begets conditions that increase fear. If Israel really wants
peace, it should adopt the compromises needed to achieve it. What are the
actual motives of the US government, the Bush administration, American
Jews, and evangelical Christians for backing Israel so unreservedly? Does
this policy promote Israel's long-term security?
Goldschmidt believes that both Palestinians and Israelis have made mis¬
takes that make them less secure. Acts of force and terrorism by one side
beget reprisals by the other. Unilateral concessions, whether by Israelis or
Palestinians, are viewed as weakness and often lead to renewed violence.