The United States
Looks to Cuba
Long before Spain and the United States
went to war over Cuba, some Americans
had looked with longing on the fertile,
strategically located island just 90 miles
from Key West, Florida. As early as 1809,
Thomas Jefferson stated, “We must have
Cuba.” John Quincy Adams, who had
engineered the annexation of Florida,
viewed American annexation of “the pearl
of the Antilles” as all but inevitable, writ-
ing as secretary of state in 1823:
There are laws political as of
physical gravitation, and if an
apple, severed by a tempest from
its native tree, cannot choose but
to fall to the ground, Cuba,
forcibly disjoined from its own
natural connection to Spain, and
incapable of self-support, can
gravitate only towards the
North American Union, which,
by the same law of nature, can-
not cast her off from her bosom.
In keeping with Adams’s view, the United
States repeatedly offered to buy Cuba
from Spain. In 1848, in the heyday of
Manifest Destiny, President James K.
Polk offered $100 million for it. Spain
adamantly turned down all such offers,
viewing them as insults to national pride.
Even without American ownership of
Cuba, the United States had tremendous
leverage over Cuban affairs, since it was
the chief market for Cuba’s primary
export, sugar; Cuba sold nearly 70 per-
cent of its annual sugar crop to the
United States. American influence
became even stronger as American corpo-
rations bought up Cuba piecemeal. By
1895 Americans had invested about $50
million in sugar plantations, mines, rail-
roads, and other businesses in Cuba.
These businessmen were eager to see
their investments in the revolution-
wracked island protected by American
military force.
Other factors joined in fueling
American support for military action in
Cuba in the late 1890s. Humanitarians
were appalled by reports of Spanish atroc-
ities in Cuba, particularly the suffering in
the concentration camps that had been set
up by order of Spanish governor-general
Valeriano Weyler. Expansionists such as
Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), then
assistant secretary of the navy, wanted to
see the United States project more
strength and influence on the world
stage—and in an age of imperialism by
European powers, such strength could
best be shown by acquisition of an overseas
empire. An economic depression that
began in 1893 was starting to subside as
the economy expanded, and many
Americans believed that new foreign mar-
kets would keep the expansion going. And
finally, the newspapers, which found they
could boost circulation by spotlighting
Spanish atrocities and urging American
intervention, encouraged pro-war senti-
ment. In an era notorious for its sensation-
alistic “yellow press,” publishing magnates
William Randolph Hearst, owner of the
New York Journal, and Joseph Pulitzer,
owner of the New York World, vied with
each other to see who could best whip up
public sentiment for war.
Some Cubans hoped for U.S. aid in
the war against Spain, and even support-
ed annexation by the United States. But
others insisted on an independent Cuba,
warning that American aid could endan-
ger that independence. Nor did they wish
to see Cuba become a small-scale imita-
tion of the United States. Writing in
exile in the United States, Martí criticized
American culture for its “excessive indi-
vidualism and reverence for wealth” even
while praising its free institutions. Above
118 ATLAS OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN HISTORY
This propaganda cartoon urges the United States to come to the aid of Cuba against
Spain. “Columbia,” a female symbol of the United States, sleeps while a figure
representing Spain dominates a Cuban. Looking on disapprovingly are statues of the
Revolutionary-era generals Von Steuben from Prussia and Lafayette of France, who
both came to the aide of the rebelling American colonies, represented here by a
bust of George Washington