wanted to protect the security of its valu-
able colonies in Mexico and the West
Indies by increasing its holdings in North
America. To that end, the Spanish want-
ed to win back East Florida, correspon-
ding roughly to present-day Florida, and
West Florida, the Gulf Coast strip from
the Apalachicola River to the Mississippi.
Spain also wanted to expand across the
Mississippi River into the eastern
Mississippi Valley; expel Britain from
Central America; and get back the
European possessions of Gibraltar and
Minorca, lost to Britain during the War
of Spanish Succession.
Even while still officially neutral,
France and Spain offered assistance to the
rebels, providing munitions, lending
money, and allowing American merchant-
men and privateers to use their ports. In
1778 France formally entered the war as
an American ally, and in 1779 Spain
joined the war as an ally of France,
though not directly of the United States,
from which it continued to maintain an
official distance.
Much of Spain’s military involve-
ment took place far away from the New
World and was aimed at tying down
Britain’s most powerful military asset, its
massive and widely feared navy. The
number of ships in the British navy out-
numbered those of either France or Spain
but did not outnumber the two in combi-
nation. Spain joined France in launching
an attempted naval invasion of Britain
(1779), blockading Gibraltar (from 1779
to the war’s end) and attacking Minorca
(captured in 1782). The Netherlands dis-
patched its own fleet to menace the
English coast, while the French harassed
the British in the Caribbean Sea and
Indian Ocean. Forced to defend their
homeland and far-flung overseas posses-
sions, the British navy was unable to pro-
vide needed support to its troops in
North America. As a result, when
General Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805)
was besieged by French ships and
American and French troops at
Yorktown, Virginia, the British navy was
not able to come to his aid. Cornwallis’s
surrender at Yorktown in 1781, which vir-
tually ended hostilities in North America,
was indirectly made possible by the sup-
port of the Spanish navy.
In addition to their indirect support
in campaigns outside North America,
Spanish troops gave comfort to theAmerican rebels closer to home, in clash-
es with the British along the Gulf Coast
and the Mississippi River. The most
important figure in these conflicts was
Bernardo de Gálvez (1746–1786), gover-
nor of Louisiana.Bernardo de Gálvez
Born into a military family, Bernardo de
Gálvez first came to the New World in
1765, as a 19-year-old captain assigned to
New Spain, where he distinguished him-
self fighting Apache on the northern fron-
tier. In 1776, now a colonel, he was
dispatched to New Orleans and was soon
named governor of Louisiana, which
France had ceded to Spain 13 years earli-
er. A speaker of French who soon married
a Frenchwoman, Gálvez became popular
with the Gallic locals, despite the differ-
ence in his nationality. Recognizing
Spain’s opportunity in the American
Revolution, he surreptitiously sent arms
and supplies to the rebels. By 1779 Great
Britain had learned of Spain’s assistance,
however, and began threatening Louisiana
with attack from forts along the British-
controlled western panhandle of Florida.
At the urging of Patrick Henry, the gover-
nor of Virginia, Gálvez recommended
that Spain declare war on Great Britain in
order not only to protect Louisiana but to
win back West Florida. When Spain66 ATLAS OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN HISTORY
Bernardo de Gálvez (Library of Congress)CATTLE FOR
THE ARMY
Texas is rarely mentioned in most
accounts of the American Revolution.
But this territory, then a northern fron-
tier region of New Spain, indirectly
supported the United States by sup-
plying beef to the soldiers of Bernardo
de Gálvez. Gálvez, the governor of the
Spanish-controlled Louisana Territory,
was sympathetic to the American
cause of independence from Great
Britain, largely because Spain and
Great Britian—together with France—
were competing for control of the
Mississippi River valley. In 1777 Gálvez
began secretly supplying gunpowder,
lead, and clothing to the American
army and protecting their ships from
British attack by pretending to seize
them until British ships had gone.
Within two years, however, word
reached Gálvez that the British intend-
ed to attack Louisiana, and in the
spring of 1779, Spain declared war on
Great Britian. To wage war, Gálvez’s
troops would need not only weapons
but food.
Cattle and other livestock had
been raised on Texas ranches since
the 1730s, and Texan ranchers had
driven their cattle to Louisiana even
while it was still in French hands and
such trade was prohibited. In 1779,
with Gálvez in need of food for his
troops, cattle imports from Texas were
finally made legal. The cattle drives
from Texas to Louisiana began with an
order for 1,500 to 2,000 head of cattle.
More herds followed, usually accom-
panied by an escort of soldiers. The
risks were great: not only did the
Comanche frequently attack, but rival
cattle owners often ended up suing
each other. Yet the benefits were also
great. A cow that sold for four pesos in
Texas might sell for 11 in Louisiana;
the valuable contraband, like clothing
or tobacco, that one might smuggle
back home to Texas despite Spain’s
restrictions on intercolonial trade was
an added incentive. In 1788 the Texas-
Louisiana livestock trade was once
again banned, a victim of peace and
Spanish mercantilist policy.