84 /-68 to /-77
too, 'lack of testimony for' is in opposition to 'testimony for'. For it [i.e.,
the lack of testimony for] is the evidence through clear facts that the
object of opinion is not just as it was opined to be. For example, when
someone is approaching from afar we guess, because of the distance, that
it is Plato; but when the distance is reduced we realize through clear
facts that it is not Plato. And this sort of thing turns out to be 'lack of
testimony for'. For the object of opinion was not testified for by what
was apparent. 216. Hence, testimony for and lack of testimony against
are the criterion of something's being true, while lack of testimony for
and testimony against are [the criterion of something's being] false. And
clear facts are the foundation and cornerstone of all [four of these].
Aetius 4.9.5 = Dox. Gr. p. 396 (248 U) [1-69]
Epicurus [says] that every sense-perception and every presentation is
true, but that some opinions are true and some are false.
Sextus M 8.63-64 (253 U) [1-70]
- Epicurus said that all sensibles are true and that every presentation
comes from something existing and is of the same sort as that which
stimulates the sense-perception. He also says that those who say that
some presentations are true and some are false are led astray because
they are not able to distinguish opinion from clear fact. At least in the
case of Orestes, when he thought he saw the Furies, his sense-perception
which was stimulated by images was true (for the images did exist),
whereas his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid [objects], held
a false opinion. 64. And further, he says, the aforementioned [philoso-
phers] who introduce a difference among presentations are not able to
convince [us] that it is the case that some of them are true and some
false. For they will not be able to instruct us in such a matter by means
of an appearance (for appearances are just what is being investigated),
nor by means of something non-evident (for that which is non-evident
has to be demonstrated by means of an appearance).
Clement of Alexandria Stromates 2.4,16.3
p. 121 Stahlin (255 U)
[1-71]Indeed, Epicurus, who more than anyone prefers pleasure to truth,
supposes that a basic grasp is the [basis] of the intellect's conviction; he
defines a basic grasp as an application [of the intellect] to something clear
and to the clear conception of the thing, and [holds] that no one can