Logic and Theory of Knowledge 127
than the first problem. 230. [Chrysippus] himself speculated, therefore,
that "impression" was used by Zeno to mean "alteration"; so that the
definition becomes like this: 'presentation is an alteration of the soul';
for it is no longer absurd that the same body at one and the same time
(when many presentations exist in us) should receive many alterations.- For just as air, when many people speak at once, receiving at one
time an indefinite number of different blows, also has many alterations,
so too the leading part of the soul will experience something similar when
it receives varied presentations. - But others say that even Chrysippus' corrected definition is not
right. For if a presentation exists, then it is an impression and an alteration
in the soul. But if an impression in the soul exists, it is not necessarily
a presentation. For if a blow to the finger or a scratch to the hand
occurs, an impression and alteration are produced in the soul, but not a
presentation, since the latter occurs not in any chance part of the soul,
but only in the intellect, that is, in the leading part of the soul. 233. In
response, the Stoics say that 'impression in the soul' implies 'insofar as
it is in the soul' .... 234. Others, starting from the same basic position,
have defended their position more subtly. For they say that 'soul' is
meant in two senses, one referring to that which holds together the entire,
continuous composite, and the other referring particularly to the leading
part. For whenever we say that man is composed of soul and body, or
that death is the separation of soul from body, we are speaking particularly
of the leading part .... 236. Therefore, when Zeno says that presentation
is an impression in the soul, he should be understood to mean not the
whole soul but only a part of it, so that what is said is "presentation is
an alteration in the leading part of the soul".
Sextus M 7.372-373 (SVF 2.56; 1.64, 484) [11-9]
372 .... For if presentation is an impression in the soul, either the
impression is in terms of depressions and elevation, as Cleanthes and his
followers think, or it is in terms of simple alteration, as Chrysippus and
his followers thought. 373. And if on the one hand these exist in terms
of depression and elevation, then the absurdities alleged by the Chrysip-
peans will follow. For if the soul in experiencing a presentation is stamped
like wax, the most recent change will always obscure the previous presen-
tation, just as the outline of the second seal wipes out the former one.
But if this is the case, then memory, which is a storehouse of presentations,
is destroyed, and so is every craft. For craft was defined as a complex
and a collection of grasps, and it is impossible for several different