Physics 167
part of the present time is future and part is past. (1082a) Consequently
it turns out that he divides the existing part of time into the non-existing
parts and the existing part; or rather, he leaves absolutely no part of time
in existence if the present has no part which is not future or past.Arius Didymus fr. 26 (= Dox. Gr. pp. 461-2;
SVF 2.509)[11-36]Chrysippus says that time is the interval of motion according to which
the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of; or, time is the interval
which accompanies the motion of the cosmos. And each and every thing
is said to move and to exist in accordance with time, unless of course
time is spoken of in two senses, as are earth and sea and void and the
universe and its parts. And just as void as a whole is infinite in every
direction, so too time as a whole is infinite in both directions; for both
the past and the future are infinite. He says most clearly that no time is
wholly present; for since the divisibility of continuous things is infinite,
time as a whole is also subject to infinite divisibility, by this method of
division. Consequently no time is present in the strictest sense, but only
loosely speaking. He says that only the present exists, whereas the past
and future subsist but do not at all exist-unless it is in the way that
predicates are said to exist, though only those which actually apply; for
example, walking 'exists for me' when I am walking, but when I am
reclining or sitting it does not 'exist for me' ....Aetius 1.18.5, 1.20.1 (= Dox. Gr. p. 316, 317;
SVF 1.95)[11-37]1.18.5 Zeno and his followers say that there is no void within the
cosmos but an indefinite void outside it.... 1.20.1 The Stoics and
Epicurus say that void, place and space are different. Void is the privation
of body, place is what is occupied by body and space is what is partly
occupied, as in the case of wine in a jar.Arius Didymus fr. 25 (Dox.Gr. p. 460-461
SVF 2.503)[11-38]Chrysippus proclaimed that place was that which is occupied through-
out by what exists or what is such as to be occupied by what exists and
is occupied throughout by some thing or things. And if what is such as
to be occupied is partly occupied by what exists and partly not, the whole
will be neither void nor place, but another unnamed thing. For the void
is spoken of similarly to empty containers, and place similarly to full ones.