xviii Introduction
Greek ethics; it was given clear expression by Plato and Aristotle. There
is always a close correlation in Greek thought between the view taken of
the human soul and its natural function and the excellence of that soul's
activity. Both the Epicureans and the Stoics retained this belief, and
indeed supported it with much more explicit argument and theorizing.
The views of the Hellenistic philosophical schools on the nature of
the human soul mark one more very important point of contrast to those
of Plato and Aristotle. And if we may dare one more -ism, let us label
this belief the Socraticism of Epicurus and the Stoics. In the earliest
dialogues of Plato, those in which we conventionally assume that Socrates'
own views are expressed most clearly, there is, fairly obviously, an as-
sumption that the human soul is fundamentally and exclusively a rational
entity. For ethical purposes, it is assumed throughout the early dialogues
that reason dominates the life of the soul to such a degree that rational
decisions about the best life fully determine the behaviour of the human
being. That view was eventually rejected by Plato and Aristotle, both of
whom argued for the existence in the soul of fundamentally non-rational
desiderative powers, which were, to be sure, amenable to control by
reason, but which nevertheless were quasi-autonomous in their function.
The struggle for the good life, then, was no longer simply a matter of
rational decision about the best way for a man to behave and live, but
depended for its success on the subordination or training of the non-
rational parts of the soul; if they were not made obedient to man's reason
they would interfere with his rational plans and decisions. The prospect
of what Plato called 'civil war in the soul' always loomed.
The Epicureans and the orthodox Stoics returned to the view of
Socrates, that the entire human soul was dominated by reason, that all
of its desiderative states and powers were in some way expressions of a
man's beliefs and decisions. It followed that weakness of will, 'civil war
in the soul' was impossible. Moral errors were, consequently, just that;
mistakes about the good life for man. This is, in a way, a much more
optimistic view of the nature of human life. Reason and reason alone was
responsible for our happiness or misery. This fundamentally Socratic
belief may not be correct; but it unmistakably defines the general character
ofHellenistic ethics. It is often held that the Epicureans and Stoic pursued
human happiness through a blind denial of the importance of external
circumstances and conditions, out of a sort of despair concerning the
power of the individual in the new social conditions of the Hellenistic
age. It is, we think, more likely that the uncompromising and perhaps
implausible emphasis on the autonomy of human reason for happiness
is a result of a carefully considered Socraticism in their understanding
of the nature of the human soul.