Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

On Fate 179

On Fate

Epictetus Discourses 2.19.1-5 [11-76]

1. The Master Argument [of Diodorus Cronos] seems to be be based
   on premisses of this sort. There is a general conflict among these three
   statements: [1] everything past and true is necessary; [2] the impossible
   does not follow from the possible; [3] there is something possible which
   neither is nor will be true. Seeing this conflict, Diodorus used the plausi-
   bility of the first two statements to establish that only that which is or
   will be true is possible. 2. But from among the [consistent] pairs [of
   statements] one man will retain these: [3] that there is something possible
   which neither is nor will be true and [2] that the impossible does not
   follow from the possible; but [he would not concede] that [1] everything
   past and true is necessary. This seems to be the position of Cleanthes
   and his followers, and Anti pater generally agreed with it. 3. Others [will
   accept] the other two, [3] that there is something possible which neither
   is nor will be true and [1] that everything past and true is necessary;
   [and they will concede] that the impossible follows from the possible. 4.
   But it is impossible to retain all three of those statements because of
   their general conflict with each other. 5. So if someone asks me, "which
   pair do you retain?". I will answer him by saying that I do not know. I
   have learned from research that Diodorus retained one pair, the followers
   ofPanthoides and Cleanthes another, and the followers ofChrysippus an-
   other.

Pseudo-Plutarch On Fate 574ef (SVF 2.912) [11-77]

(547e) According to the opposing argument, the first and most impor-

tant point would seem to be that nothing happens uncaused, but according

to prior causes. Second, that this cosmos, which is itself coordinated and

sympathetic with itself, is administered by nature. Third, which would

seem rather to be additional evidence, is the fact that divination is in

good repute with all men because it really does exist, with divine coopera-

tion, and second that wise men are contented in the face of events, (547£)

since all of them occur according to [divine] allotment; and third, the

much-discussed point, that every proposition is true or false.

Theodoretus Graecarum A.ffectionum Cura
6.14 (SVF 2.916)

[11-78]

And Chrysippus the Stoic said that what is necessitated is no different

from what is fated, and that fate is an eternal, continuous and ordered