Ethics 215
unnatural has disvalue. Value has three senses: [I] the estimation and
honour [for something] in itself, and [2] the exchange-value of its ap-
praised worth; and [3] third what Anti pater calls selective value, according
to which when circumstances permit we choose these things rather than
those, for example, health rather than disease and life rather than death
and wealth rather than poverty. Analogously, they also say that disvalue
has three senses, if one inverts the senses [of the definitions] given for
the three kinds of value.
Diogenes says that the 'estimation' is a judgement of the extent to
which something is natural or provides something useful to nature. 'Ap-
praised worth' is not interpreted in the sense in which the things [them-
selves] are said to have 'appraised worth', but as we say that he who puts
an appraisal on things is the 'appraiser'. For he says that such a man is
the 'appraiser' of exchange-value. And these are the two [senses of] value
according to which we say that something is preferred in value, and he
says that the third is that according to which we say that something has
valuable merit and value, which does not apply to things indifferent but
only to virtuous things. He says that we sometimes use the word 'value'
in place of 'what is fitting', as it was used in the definition of justice
when it is said to be a condition which distributes to each person what
is accordance with his value; for this is like saying 'what is fitting' for
each person.
7g. Of things which have value, some have a lot of value, some have
little. Similarly, of things which have disvalue, some have a lot of disvalue,
some have little. Those which have a lot of value are called preferred
things, while those which have a lot of disvalue are called rejected, Zeno
being the first one to apply these terms to the things. They say that the
preferred is that which, being indifferent, we select in accordance with
the principal reason. The same kind of account applies to what is rejected,
and the examples are the same by analogy. None of the good things is
preferred, since they have the greatest value. The preferred, which holds
the second rank and has value, is in a way close to the nature of good
things. For at a court the king is not among those who are preferred,
but those below him in rank are. They are called preferred, not because
they contribute to happiness and help to produce it, but because it is
necessary to select them in preference to the rejected things.
- The topic of appropriate action follows [naturally] on the discussion
of the preferred things. Appropriate action is defined [thus]: 'what is
consistent in life, which when done admits of a reasonable defence'. What
is contrary to the appropriate is the opposite. This extends even to
irrational animals, for they too do thing[s] consistently with their nature.
In rational animals it is expressed thus: 'what is consistent in a life'. And