Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

Ethics 221
[moral] mistake did not do so because of himself, although [in fact]
everyone who makes a [moral] mistake does so because of his own vice.
And that is why it is quite proper for them to say that he does not even
forgive those who make [moral] mistakes. Nor, they say, is the good man
equitable, since the equitable man is prone to ask for a reduction of the
punishment which is due; and it is characteristic of the same man to be
equitable and to suppose that the punishments established by the law
for wrong-doers are too harsh, and to believe that the lawgiver established
punishments which are unduly [severe].
They say that the law is virtuous, being right reason which commands
what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done. And since the
law is virtuous, the lawful man would be virtuous; for he is a man who
is lawful and follows the law and does what is commanded by it. He who
interprets the law is a man of the law; and none of the base is either
lawful or a man of the law.
lie. Again, they say that some activities are [morally] perfect actions,
some are [moral] mistakes, and some are neither. [Morally] perfect actions
are such things: being prudent, being temperate, acting justly, feeling
joy, doing good works, being in good spirits, walking prudently, and
everything which is done in accordance with right reason. [Moral] mis-
takes are: being imprudent, being wanton, unjust action, feeling pain and
fear, stealing, and in general whatever is done contrary to right reason.
Such things as these are neither [morally] perfect actions nor [moral]
mistakes: speaking, asking, answering, walking, going out of town, and
similar things. All [morally] perfect actions are just actions and lawful
actions and orderly actions and good practices and acts of good fortune
and acts of a happy life and opportune actions and beautifully-ordered
actions. They are, however, not yet acts of prudence, but only those
which are performed on the basis of prudence and similarly for all the
other virtues-even if they do not have proper names, such as acts of
temperance which are performed on the basis of temperance and acts of
justice which are performed on the basis of justice. By contrast, [moral]
mistakes are unjust actions and unlawful actions and disorderly actions.
llf. They say that just as there is a difference between what is worth
choosing and what is to be chosen, so there is a difference between what
is worth striving for and what is to be striven for and what is worth
wishing for and what is to be wished for and what is worth accepting
and what is to be accepted. For are worth choosing and
wishing for and striving for <and accepting; but advantages are to be
chosen and wished for and striven for> and accepted, since they are
predicates corresponding to the good things. For we choose what is to
be chosen and want what is to be wanted and strive for what is to be