Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory
Ethics 227
- They say that all [moral] mistakes are equal, but not, however/^1
similar. For by nature they all derive from vice as from a single source,
since in all [moral] mistakes the decision is the same; but [moral] mistakes
do differ in quality with regard to the external cause, since there are
differences among the intermediate things which are the subject of the de-
ctstons.
You could get a clear image of the point being demonstrated by
attending to the following: every falsehood is equally a falsehood; for one
is no more in error than another; for the statement "it is night"
is a falsehood, just as is the statement "a centaur lives"; and it is no more
possible to say that the one is a falsehood than to say that the other is;
but the falseness in each is not equally false, and those who are in error
are not equally in error. And it is not possible to be making a [moral]
mistake to a greater or lesser degree, since every [moral] mistake is
performed in virtue of being in error. Moreover, it is not the case that
a [morally] correct action does not admit of being greater or lesser while
a [moral] mistake does admit of being greater or lesser; for they [i.e.,
moral mistakes and morally correct actions] are all complete and that is
why they could not be deficient or excessive with respect to each other.
Therefore, all [moral] mistakes are equal.
11m. As to natural ability and noble birth, some members of this school
were led to say that every wise man is endowed with these attributes; but
others were not. For some think that men are not only endowed with a
natural ability for virtue by nature, but also that some are such by training,
and they accepted this proverbial saying:^52 "practice, when aged by time,
turns into nature." And they made the same supposition about noble
birth, so that natural ability is a condition congenial to virtue which
comes from nature or training, or a condition by which certain men are
prone to acquire virtue readily. And noble birth is a condition congenial
to virtue which comes from birth or training.
Since the virtuous man is affable in conversation and charming and
encouraging and prone to pursue good will and friendship through his
conversation, he fits in as well as possible with the majority of men; and
that is why he is lovable and graceful and persuasive, and again flattering
and shrewd and opportune and quick-witted and easy-going and unfussy
and straightforward and unfeigned. And the base man is subject to all
the opposite traits. And they say that being ironic is a trait of base men
and that no free and virtuous man is ironic. Similarly for sarcasm, which
- Literally, "not yet" or "no longer".
- From an unknown tragedy, 227 Nauck.
