Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory
Ethics 239
- Let us now see how splendidly these further points follow from
what I have already expounded .... So, since the goal is to live consistently
and in agreement with nature, it follows necessarily that all wise men
always live happy, perfect and fortunate lives, that they are impeded by
nothing, hindered by nothing and in need of nothing. The key not only
to the doctrines of which I am speaking, but also to our life and fortune
is that we should judge that only what is honourable is good. This point
can be elaborated and developed fully and copiously, with all the choicest
words and profoundest sentiments which rhetorical art can produce; but
I prefer the short and pointed syllogisms of the Stoics.
- Their arguments go like this: everything which is good is praisewor-
thy; but everything which is praiseworthy is honourable; therefore, that
which is good is honourable. Does this argument seem valid enough?
Surely it does; for as you see the argument concludes with a point which
is proven by the two premisses. Generally speaking, people attack the
former of the two premisses and claim that it is not the case that everything
which is good is praiseworthy; for they concede that what is praiseworthy
is honourable. But it is totally absurd [to claim] that something is good
but not worth choosing, or worth choosing but not pleasing, or pleasing
but not also to be loved; and so it is also to be approved of; so it is also
praiseworthy; but that is [the same as] honourable. So it turns out that
what is good is also honourable.
- Next, I ask who can boast of a life if it is wretched or even just
not happy. So we boast only of a happy life. From this it results that
the happy life is, if I may put it so, worth boasting about; and this cannot
properly [be said to] happen to any life but one which is honourable. So
it turns out that an honourable life is a happy life. Moreover, since
someone who is justly praised must have about him something remarkable,
either in point of honour or glory, so that he can justly be called happy
on account of these very valuable attributes, the same thing can be said
most properly about the life of such a man. So if the honourable is a
criterion for a happy life, one must hold that what is honourable is
also good.
- What? Could anyone deny that we could never have a man who
is of steadfast and reliable spirit, a man you could call brave, unless it
is firmly established that pain is not a bad thing? For just as someone
who regards death as a bad thing cannot help but fear it, in the same
way no one can be indifferent to and despise something which he regards
as bad. Once this point is established and assented to, our next premiss
is that magnanimous and strong-hearted men are able to despise and
ignore everything which fortune can bring to bear against man. Conse-
quently, it is proven that there is nothing bad which is not also shameful.
