242 //-103 to //-106
naturally shrink from pain, so too it is apparent that we are driven by
nature herself to love those whom we bear. 63. From this it develops
naturally that there is among men a common and natural congeniality
of men with each other, with the result that it is right for them to feel
that other men, just because they are men, are not alien to them .... So
we are naturally suited to [living in] gatherings, groups and states.
- They also hold that the cosmos is ruled by the will of the gods,
that it is like a city or state shared by gods and men, and that each and
every one of us is a part of this cosmos. From which it naturally follows
that we put the common advantage ahead of our own. For just as the
laws put the well-being of all ahead of the well-being of individuals, so
too the good and wise man, who is obedient to the laws and not unaware
of his civic duty, looks out for the advantage of all more than for that
of any one person or his own .... - But just as they think that the bonds of justice unite men with
each other, so too they deny that there is any bond of justice between
man and beast. Chrysippus expressed it well, saying that everything else
was born for the sake of men and gods, but they were born for the sake
of their own community and society, with the result that men can use
beasts for their own advantage without injustice .... - They also think that friendship should be cultivated because it
falls into the class of beneficial things. Although some [Stoics] say that
in a friendship a friend's reason is just as dear to the wise man as is his
own, while others say that each man's reason is dearer to himself, even
this latter group admits that to deprive someone of something in order
to appropriate it for oneself is inconsistent with justice, which is a virtue
we are naturally committed to. So the school I am speaking of does not
at all approve of the view that justice or friendship should be welcomed
or approved of because of its advantages. For the very same advantages
could just as well undermine and overthrow them. Indeed, neither justice
nor friendship can exist at all unless they are chosen for their own sakes.
Epictetus Discourses 1.22.1-4 [11-104]
- Basic grasps are common to all men, and one basic grasp does not
conflict with another; for which of us does not suppose that the good is
advantageous and worth choosing and that one ought to go for it and
pursue it in all circumstances? Which of us does not suppose that the
good is honourable and fitting? So where does the conflict come from? - In the application of basic grasps to individual substances; 3. as when
one man says "He did well and is brave!" [and someone else says,] "No,
he is crazy." This is the source of the conflict between men. 4. The