256 //-115 to //-117
same as] virtue; for from this as from a spring every other utility naturally
flows. 26. In another sense it is that according to which being benefitted
is a characteristic result. In this not only will the virtues be called good
but also virtuous actions, since it is characteristic of them that benefit
results. 27. In the third and final sense good is said to be that which is
such as to benefit, this description encompassing the virtues, virtuous
actions, friends, virtuous men and gods and excellent daimons .... 30.
... and there were some who said that the good is that which is worth
choosing for its own sake; and some who used this definition: "good is
that which contributes to happiness"; and others who said that it is "that
which fulfils happiness". And happiness is, according to definition given
by the followers ofZeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, a smooth flow of life.
Sextus Empiricus M 11.61-67 (SVF 3.122) [11-116]
- In the third and final sense the indifferent is that which contributes
neither to happiness nor to misery, and it is in this sense that they say
that health and disease and everything bodily and most external things
are indifferent, since they tend to produce neither happiness nor misery.
For that which can be used well and badly would be indifferent. Virtue
is always used well; vice is always used badly; but health and bodily
things can be used sometimes well and sometimes badly, and that is why
they would be indifferent. 62. And of indifferents, they say, some are
preferred and some are rejected; the preferred are those which have
considerable value, the rejected are those which have considerable dis-
value, and neither preferred nor rejected are things like holding one's
finger straight or crooked and everything like this. 63. Health and strength
and beauty, wealth and reputation and things like these, are counted
among the preferred things; disease and poverty and pain and similar
things are counted among the rejected. That is what the Stoics say. - Ariston of Chios said that health and everything similar to it are
not preferred indifferents. For to say that it is a preferred indifferent is
tantamount to claiming that it is good, since they practically differ only
in name. 65. In general, things which are indifferent as between virtue
and vice are indistinguishable, nor are some naturally preferred and
others naturally rejected; rather [they vary] in accordance with different
circumstances and occasions. Thus things which are said to be preferred
are not unconditionally preferred, nor are things called rejected uncondi-
tionally rejected. 66. Anyway, if it were necessary for healthy men to
serve a tyrant and for this reason to be executed, while sick men were
released from service and so also freed from destruction, the wise man
would choose sickness over health on such an occasion. And in this way