282 l//-20
of his on Suspension of Assent and the things I am about to say are taken
from book one.
- According to Carneades, there are two kinds of presentations: one
kind is subdivided into those which can be perceived and those which
cannot: the other kind is subdivided into those that are plausible and
those that are not. So, the objections raised against the senses and clarity
belong to the first division, whereas no objection should be made to
the second. Therefore, he held that there is no presentation such that
perception follows, but many, however, such that plausibility does. For
it is contrary to nature that nothing should be plausible; the overthrow
of all life that you were referring to, Lucullus, follows [on that view].
Thus, many things are plausible to the senses, provided it is held that
there is nothing about the presentations such that there could not possibly
be a false one that did not differ from it. Thus, the wise man will employ
whatever apparently plausible presentations he meets with, provided
there is nothing which opposes its plausibility, and thus will every plan
of life be governed. In fact, even he who is introduced by you as a wise
man will follow many things as being plausible, but neither grasped nor
perceived nor assented to, but as being like truth. And unless he approves
of them, all life would be eliminated. 100. What else? Surely when a
wise man goes on board a ship, he has not grasped with his mind or
perceived that he will sail away as intended. Who could? But if he were
to set out from here to Puteoli, a distance of 30 stades, with a sound
ship, a good captain, waters calm as they are now, it would seem plausible
to him that he would arrive safely at his destination. In this manner, he
takes presentations as guides for acting and not acting, and he will be
readier to approve of the claim that snow is white than was Anaxagoras
(who not only denied that snow was white but, because he knew that
the water from which it was composed was black, even denied that it
appeared white to himself), 101. and will be moved by whatever thing
strikes him as a presentation that is plausible and not impeded by any
other thing. For he is not carved out of stone or hewn from wood; he
has a body, a soul, he is moved with his mind and senses, so that many
things seem true to him, although they do not have that distinctive and
peculiar mark of perceptibility, and for that reason the wise man does
not assent, for there can exist a false presentation indistinguishable from
a true one. Nor do we speak against the senses differently from the Stoics,
who say that many things are false and are very different from how they
appear to the senses.
If, however, it is the case that the senses receive even one false presenta-
tion, he is right here to deny that anything can be perceived with the
senses. In this way, without a word from us, but with one principle from