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dence regarding any of the matters which have been subject to dogmatic
assertions in physical theory, we do not have a physical doctrine. But in
the sense of opposing every argument with an equal argument and in
the matter of freedom from disturbance, we do touch upon physical
doctrine. We proceed similarly in the logical and ethical parts of what
is called 'philosophy'.
Ch. x Do the Sceptics Eliminate Appearances?
- Those who say that the sceptics eliminate appearances seem to me
not to have listened to what we have said. For we do not overturn
that which, as a result of a state produced by a presentation, leads us
involuntarily to assent, as we said previously. But these are just what
appearances are. Whenever we investigate the question of whether an
object is such as it appears to be, we grant that it appears as such, since
we are not investigating the appearance, but rather the claims made about
the appearance. And this is different from investigating the appearance
itself. 20. For example, it appears to us that honey sweetens. This we
concede, for we have the sensation of sweetness. What we investigate is
whether honey is sweet as far as concerns its essence, which is not [a
matter of] the appearance, but is something said about the appearance.
And even if we use reasoning directly against the appearances, we do
not do so with the intention of eliminating them, but rather with the
intention of displaying the rashness of the dogmatists. For if such reason-
ing is so deceptive that it practically snatches away the appearances from
under our eyes, ought we not to be suspicious of its use in regard to
things non-evident, so that we had best not be so rash as to follow it there?
Ch. xi On the Criterion of Scepticism
- That we pay attention to appearances is clear from that which is said
by us about the criterion of the sceptical approach. The term "criterion" is
used in two senses: [1] that which is accepted as a reliable indication of
the existence or non-existence of something (concerning which we will
speak in our refutation [of the dogmatic positions]); [2] that which is
accepted [as a criterion] for action, by attending to which we will do
some things and not do others in life. It is the latter which we are now
discussing. 22. We say that the appearance is the criterion of the sceptical
approach, in this way referring in effect to the presentation of it, for
since it [i.e., the presentation] is located in a feeling or an involuntary
state, it is not open to investigation. For this reason, probably no one
disputes that an object appears one way or another; the investigation
concerns whether it really is such as it appears. 23. So, attending to
appearance we live undogmatically according to the rules of everyday