308 ///-26 to ///-27
inconsistency of appearances and ideas, and not being able to do this,
they suspended judgement. Being in this suspensive state, freedom from
disturbance followed fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body. We do
not believe, however, that the sceptic is totally without troubles, but
rather that he is troubled by things that are matters of compulsion.
We agree that he is sometimes cold and sometimes thirsty and that he
experiences such things. 30. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary
people are distressed by two circumstances-by the states themselves
and no less by the belief that the circumstances [under which the states
are experienced] are bad by nature-the sceptic, by rejecting the addi-
tional belief that each of these is not only bad but bad by nature, will
escape with more moderate states. For this reason, we say that the goal
of the sceptic is freedom from disturbance in regard to beliefs and moder-
ate states in regard to matters of compulsion. But some of the famous
sceptics add to these suspension of judgement in investigations.
Ch. xiii On the General Modes Leading to Suspension of
Judgement
- Since we said that freedom from disturbance follows suspension
of judgement about everything, it is appropriate to say next how suspen-
sion of judgement comes about in us. Speaking rather generally, suspen-
sion of judgement comes about through the opposition of things. We
oppose appearances to appearances, or ideas to ideas, or, interchanging
them [appearances to ideas or ideas to appearances]. 32. For example,
we oppose appearances to appearances when we say, "The same tower
that appears round from far away appears square when nearby;" we
oppose ideas to ideas when, in reply to someone constructing a proof of
providence based on the orderliness of the heavenly bodies, we counter
with the fact that frequently good people fare ill and bad people prosper,
and from this we infer that providence does not exist; 33. we oppose
ideas to appearances just as did Anaxagoras when he opposed the claim
that snow is white, saying that snow is frozen water, water is black and,
therefore, snow is black. We oppose things according to a different
conception when, as in the previous example, we oppose things present
to things present and when we oppose things present to things past or
future. For example, whenever someone challenges us with an argument
which we are not able to refute, 34. we say to him that just as before
the founder of your system was born, it was not clear that the argument
based on the system was sound, although it existed in nature, so it is
possible that the argument opposed to the one made by you exists in
nature, although it is not yet clear to us. Therefore, we ought not yet
assent to the argument which now seems to us to be the stronger.