Sextus Empiricus: General Principles 323
positing or abolishing any of the non-evident matters being investigated,
as is clear from what we have already said about the other [sceptical] utter-
ances.
Ch. xxvii On the Utterance 'To Every Argument an Equal
Argument is Opposed'
- When we say 'to every argument an equal argument is opposed',
we mean by 'every' every one examined by us; by 'argument' we intend
not the unqualified sense of the word but rather an argument which
[purports to] establish something dogmatically, i.e., dealing with some-
thing non-evident, and not necessarily an argument composed of prem-
isses and a conclusion but one which [purports to] establish something
in any way at all. By 'equal' we mean with respect to trustworthiness or
untrustworthiness; and we use 'is opposed' in a general sense, in place
of 'conflicts with'; and we also supply the phrase 'as it appears to me'.
- So when I say 'to every argument an equal argument is opposed' I
implicitly say this: 'to every argument examined by me which establishes
something dogmatically it seems to me that there is another and opposing
argument which establishes something dogmatically, equal to the first
with respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness'. Thus the utter-
ance of the statement is not dogmatic but a mere announcement of a
state in a human being which is apparent to the person in that state.
- The utterance 'to every argument an equal argument is opposed'
is employed by some sceptics in the following sense. They think that it
should be imperatival, like this: 'let us oppose to every argument which
establishes something dogmatically an argument which dogmatically in-
vestigates [the question], is equal to it in terms of trustworthiness and
untrustworthiness, and is in conflict with it'. So their statement is directed
at the sceptic but they use the infinitive in place of the imperatival form
('is opposed' in place of 'let us oppose'). 205. They urge this on the
sceptic so that he will not be led astray by the dogmatist and give up
his sceptical mode of investigation, and so, because of his rashness, lose
that freedom from disturbance which is apparent to them and which
they believe is dependent on suspension of judgement about everything,
as we said above.^30
Ch. xxviii Additional Notes on Sceptical Utterances
- It will be sufficient if we give a rough outline of these utterances,
especially since it is possible, on the basis of what we have now said, to
deal with the others too. For concerning all the sceptical utterances one
- III-26 (25-30).
