334 l//-35
he will not be trustworthy; but if he wants to use a demonstration, either
he will say that the demonstration is false and so overturn himself, or if
he says that the demonstration is true he will be asked for a demonstration
that it is true, and then for another [to confirm] that, since it too must
be true; and so on to infinity. But it is impossible to provide an infinite
number of proofs. 123. Therefore, he will not be in a position to prefer
one presentation over another with a demonstration. But if one is not able
to decide on the above-mentioned presentations either with or without a
demonstration, then the conclusion is suspension of judgement, since we
are perhaps able to say how each appears in this position or at this
distance or in this place but not able to declare how each thing is in its
nature, for the above-mentioned reasons.
- [6] The sixth mode is that based on mixtures, according to which
we conclude that since none of the external objects strikes us all on its
own but together with something, it is perhaps possible to say how the
mixture of the object and that together with which it is observed strikes
us, but we could not say how the external object is all on its own. That
none of the external objects strikes us all on its own but certainly together
with something else, and that because of this it is observed to be different,
these points, I think, are self-evident. 125. At any rate, our colour is seen
as different in warm air and in cold, and we could not say what our
colour is like in its nature, but rather [we could say] how it is observed
when together with each of these .... - To move on from external mixtures, our eyes have in them both
membranes and fluid. So since the visible things are not observed without
these, they will not be grasped with accuracy; for we grasp the mixture
and for this reason people with jaundice see everything as yellow and
those with bloodshot eyes see everything as red .... 127 .... So because
of the mixtures the senses do not grasp with accuracy what the external
objects are like. - But neither does the intellect, especially since its guides, the
senses, make mistakes. And perhaps it too contributes a certain mixture
of its own to the announcements made by the senses. For in each of the
places in which the dogmatists think the leading part of the soul exists
we observe that there are certain underlying humours, whether one wishes
to posit that it is in the brain or in the heart or in any other part of the
animal. So in this way too we see that, being unable to say anything about
the nature of the external objects, we are compelled to suspend judgement. - [7] We said that the seventh mode was that which employed the
quantities and structures of objects, in a general way meaning by struc-
tures the composition [of the things]. It is evident that by this mode too