340 l/1-37 to /l/-38
dogmatic causal explanation and show that it is pernicious. 181. [1] The
first of these, he says, is that according to which the whole class of causal
explanations, being wrapped up in the non-apparent, is not supported
by agreed upon testimony from the appearances. [2] Second, is that
according to which it is shown that there is a generous abundance of
[explanations] so that one can causally explain the object of investigation
in many ways, and yet some of them explain it in one way only. 182. [3]
Third, is that according to which it is shown that for things that have
come about in an orderly way [the causalists] provide explanations which
show no order. [4] Fourth, is that according to which it is shown that
when they grasp how appearances come about, they believe they have
also grasped how things not apparent have come about, whereas though
it is possible that the non-apparent may have come to be in a way similar
to that of the appearances, it is also possible that they did not come about
in a similar way, but in their own peculiar way. 183. [5] Fifth, is that
according to which it is shown that practically all of them give causal
explanations, according to their own personal hypotheses about the ele-
ments, and not according to certain common and agreed upon procedures.
[6] Sixth, is that according to which it is shown that whereas they
frequently admit things indicated by their own personal hypotheses, they
reject things that tend to conflict with them, although they possess equal
plausibility. 184. [7] Seventh, is that according to which it is shown
that frequently they provide explanations that conflict not only with
experiences but even with their own personal theories. [8] Eighth, is that
according to which when there is similar doubt about things seemingly
apparent and about things being investigated, they frequently base their
teachings on things similarly doubtful [i.e., the appearances] and apply
them to things similarly doubtful [i.e., the things investigated]. 185. He
also says that it is not impossible that some of those who offer causal
explanations fail in accordance with certain mixed modes derived from
the above.
It is perhaps also the case that the five modes of the suspension of
judgement are sufficient for use against the causalists. For should someone
mention a cause, either it is in harmony with all the philosophical systems
and scepticism and the appearances or not. But it is probably not possible
that it should be in harmony with them, for appearances and non-evident
things have all been subject to disagreement. 186. If, however, the cause
is not in harmony [with philosophical doctrine, scepticism, and appear-
ances], he who mentions it will be asked for the cause of this [cause],
and if he takes it as an apparent [cause] of an apparent [cause] or, a non-
evident cause of a non-evident [cause], he will fall into an infinite regress;
or, interchanging them, [if the apparent cause is of a non-evident cause