352 l//-40
a falsehood as in 'if the earth is flying, the earth is winged' or it begins
with a truth and ends with a falsehood as in 'if the earth exists, the earth
is flying.' They say that of these only the one that begins with a truth
and ends with a falsehood is unsound, whereas the others are sound.
- They say that the antecedent is the first clause in the conditional
that begins with a truth and ends with a truth. It is revelatory of the
consequent, since 'she has milk' seems to reveal that 'she has conceived'
in the conditional 'if she has milk, she has conceived.' - These are the Stoics' doctrines. We, however, say first that it is
non-evident whether a lekton [things said] exists. For since the Epicureans
say that the thing said does not exist and the Stoics say that it does,
either they are making a bare assertion or they have a demonstration.
But if it is just a bare assertion, the Epicureans will oppose them with
the assertion that the thing said does not exist. If they adduce a demonstra-
tion, since the demonstration is composed of propositions which are said,
it will not be able to be adduced for the purpose of confirmation that
the thing said exists, since it is composed of things said. For how will
one who does not grant [the existence of] the thing said allow that a
complex of things said exists? 108. So, he who tries to establish the
existence of a thing said on the basis of a complex of things said is
someone who wants to confirm a matter under investigation by means
of the matter under investigation. If, therefore, it is not possible to show
either simply or by means of a demonstration that a thing said exists, it
is non-evident.
The case is similar for the existence of a proposition. 109. For a
proposition is a thing said. And perhaps even if it should be granted for
the sake of hypothesis that a thing said exists, the proposition is found
to be non-existent, being composed of things said not existing at the
same time as each other. For example, take 'if it is day, it is light.' When
I say 'it is day' the 'it is light' [part] is not yet in existence and when I
say 'it is light' the 'it is day' [part] is no longer in existence. If, therefore,
the composite cannot possibly exist without the parts themselves existing
at the same time as each other, and [the parts] of which the proposition
is composed do not exist at the same time as each other, the proposition
will not exist. - To pass over this problem, the sound conditional will be found
to be ungraspable. Philo says that a sound conditional is one which does
not have a true antecedent and a false consequent, for example, 'if it is
day, I am conversing' when it is day and I am conversing, whereas
Diodorus [Cronus] [says that a sound conditional] is that of which it
neither was nor is possible that it should have a true antecedent and a
false consequent. According to him, the conditional just mentioned seems