354 /l/-40
- To pass over this problem too, [the antecedent sign] is not able
to reveal the consequent, at least if the thing signified is relative to the
sign and for this reason is grasped along with it. For things relative to
each other are grasped along with each other. And just as 'right' is not
able to be grasped as 'right' of 'left' before 'left' [is grasped] nor vice
versa, and similarly in the case of other relatives, so the sign will not be
capable of being grasped as being a [sign] of the signified before that
which is signified. 118. If, therefore, the sign is not grasped prior to the
grasp of that which is signified, there cannot exist something that reveals
that which is grasped at the same time as it and not after it.
Therefore, at least as far as concerns the more general claims of those
we disagree with, the sign is inconceivable. For they say that it is relative
and reveals the thing signified, and that that to which it is relative exists. - For this reason, if it is relative, and relative to the thing signified,
it ought to be grasped along with the thing signified, just as 'left' with
'right' and 'up' with 'down' and the other relatives. But if it [the sign]
reveals that which is signified, it ought to be grasped prior to it, so that,
having been understood first, it might lead us to a conception of that
which is known on the basis of it. 120. But it is impossible to conceive
of a thing, not being able to have previously grasped that which must
first necessarily be known. So, it is impossible to conceive of something
which is relative and reveals that in relation to which it is conceived.
But they say that the sign is relative and reveals that which is signified.
So, it is impossible to conceive of the sign. - In addition, this should be said. There has been a disagreement
among our predecessors, some saying the indicative sign exists, some
saying that it does not. The one who says that the indicative sign exists
either says it simply and without demonstration, using bare assertion, or
else with a demonstration. But if he uses bare assertion, he will not be
trusted, but if he should desire to give a demonstration, he will be seizing
upon that which is under investigation. 122. For since the demonstration
is said to be a kind of sign, and the dispute is precisely whether a sign
exists or not, there will be a dispute concerning whether a demonstration
exists or not, just as when we investigate, for the sake of a hypothesis,
'does a living thing exist' the existence of man is also investigated, for
man is a living thing. But it is absurd to try to demonstrate that which
is under investigation by means of that which is equally under investiga-
tion or by means of itself. Therefore, someone will not be able to assert
definitely that a sign exists by means of a demonstration. 123. If, then,
it is not possible either simply or with a demonstration to pronounce
definitively about signs, it is impossible for a graspable pronouncement