356 ///-40 to ///-41
non-evident but also appears; the argument, however, is about signs that
are hypothesized as non-evident, and yet are found to be appearances,
according to the turning around of the argument.
- If, therefore, neither all signs are appearances nor all non-evident,
nor are some appearances and some non-evident, and there are no other
alternatives, as they themselves say, the things called signs will not exist. - These few, out of the many [available arguments] will be sufficient
for the present purpose of suggesting the non-existence of the indicative
sign. Next, we shall set forth suggestions that a sign exists, so that we
may display the equal force of the opposing arguments.
Either, then, the utterances used against the sign signify something
or nothing. If they are without significance, how could they dislodge the
existence of the sign? If they signify something, a sign exists. 131. Further,
either the arguments against the sign are demonstrative or not. But if
they are not demonstrative, they will not demonstrate that the sign does
not exist. If they are demonstrative, since the demonstration is a kind of
sign, revealing the conclusion, it will be a sign. Hence, one also propounds
this sort of argument. If a sign exists, a sign exists; and if a sign does
not exist, a sign exists. (For the non-existence of a sign is shown by
demonstration, which is indeed a sign, as has been shown.) But a sign
exists or a sign does not exist. So, a sign exists. 132. But the following
argument is set against this one. If a sign does not exist, a sign does not
exist; and if a sign is what the dogmatists say it is, a sign does not exist.
For the sign, the subject of the present argument, has been found to be
non-existent according to its conception and as it is said to be relative
and revelatory of that which is signified, as we have shown. 133. Either
sign exists or it does not; therefore, sign does not exist.
And regarding the utterances about the sign, let the dogmatists them-
selves reply to us whether they signify something or signify nothing. For
if they signify nothing, the existence of the sign is not confirmed. But
if they signify something, that which is signified will follow, namely, that
a sign exists, which entails that sign doesexist, as we have suggested,
on the basis of the reversal of the argument.
These, then, being the plausible arguments brought forth concerning
the existence and non-existence of the sign, we should say that sign no
more exists than not.
Sextus PH 2.134-159 [III-41]
Ch. xii On Demonstration
- It is clear then from these considerations that demonstration too
is not a matter agreed upon. For if we suspend judgement regarding the