Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

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  1. The argument is improper by omission in which something is
    left out which is needed for the conclusive deduction of the conclusion.
    For example, this is a sound argument, as they think, in 'wealth is either
    good or bad or indifferent; but it is not bad or indifferent; therefore, it
    is good'; but the following is a bad argument on the grounds of omission:
    'wealth is either good or bad; it is not bad; therefore, it is good'. 151.
    If, then, I show that on the basis of what they say it is not possible to
    discern a difference between non-conclusive and conclusive arguments,
    I have shown that the conclusive argument is ungraspable, so that their
    limitless treatises on dialectic are superfluous. I show this in the follow-
    ing way.

  2. The argument that was said to be non-conclusive because of
    logical disconnectedness is understood to be so from the fact that there
    is no logical connection between the premisses and between the premisses
    and the conclusion. Since, therefore, the judgement about the conditional
    ought to precede the understanding of these logical connections and the
    conditional is undecidable, as I have argued, the non-conclusive argument
    based on logical disconnectedness will be indiscernible from a [conclusive
    argument]. 153. For he who is stating that some argument is non-
    conclusive because of logical disconnectedness, if he is merely making
    an assertion, will have contradicting him an assertion opposed to what
    he previously said; whereas if he demonstrates by means of an argument,
    he will be told that this argument must first be [shown to be] conclusive,
    and then he can use it to demonstrate that the argument said to be
    logically disconnected has premisses that are without logical connections.
    But we shall not know if it is demonstrative, not having an agreed upon
    means of judging the conditional, by which we can judge if the conclusion
    is logically connected to the combination of the premises. And, therefore,
    on this basis we shall not be able to discern the difference between
    an argument that is improper because of logical disconnectedness and
    conclusive ones.

  3. We shall say the same things to someone who states that some
    argument is improper because of being asserted in improper form. For
    he who is trying to establish that a form is improper will not have an
    agreed upon conclusive argument by means of which he will be able to
    deduce what he states. 155. And by means of these criticisms we have
    implicitly refuted those who attempt to show that arguments are non-
    conclusive by omission. For if the complete and finished argument is
    indiscernible [from a non-conclusive argument], the argument defective
    by omission will also be non-evident. And further, he who desires to
    show that some argument is defective by omission by means of an argu-

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