Sextus Empiricus: Physics 363
nature and his origin and his location. Their indecisive dispute has made
him seem non-evident to us and in need of demonstration. 7. Now the
one who demonstrates the existence of god must do so either by means
of something self-evident or something not. Certainly he does not do so
by means of something self-evident. For if that which demonstrates the
existence of god were self-evident, then, since that which is demonstrated
is conceived with reference to that which demonstrates, and is simultane-
ously understood along with it (as we have already shown),^38 the existence
of god will also be self-evident, since it is grasped along with that which
demonstrates it and is self-evident. But as we have suggested, it is not
self-evident. Nor then is his existence demonstrated by means of some-
thing self-evident. 8. But neither is it demonstrated by means of some-
thing that is non-evident. For the non-evident [thing] that is supposed
to demonstrate the existence of god is in need of demonstration, but if
it is said to be demonstrated by means of something self-evident, it itself
will no longer be non-evident, but self-evident. So it is not the case
that the non-evident thing which demonstrates the existence of god
is demonstrated by means of something self-evident. But neither is it
demonstrated by means of something non-evident, for one who says this
falls into an infinite regress, always being asked by us for a demonstration
of the non-evident propositions adduced as demonstrative of the one
previously set forth. Therefore, one is not able to demonstrate the exis-
tence of god on the basis of something else. 9. And if god's existence is
neither self-evident on its own nor demonstrable on the basis of something
else, the existence of god will be ungraspable.
Further, this too ought to be said. He who says that god exists either
holds that god is provident of things in the cosmos or he is not, and if
he is provident, then he is so either for everything or [only] for some
things. But if he is provident of everything, there would be no bad thing
nor any vice in the cosmos. Yet, they say that all things are full of vice.
Therefore, god will not be said to be provident of everything. 10. If,
however, he is provident of some things, why these things and not those?
For either he wishes and is able to be provident of everything, or he
wishes to be provident, but is not able, or he is able but does not wish
to be, or he neither wishes nor is able to be provident. But if he wished
to be provident and was able, then he would be provident of everything.
But he is not provident of everything, for the reasons given above.
Therefore, it is not the case that he both wishes to be provident and is
able to be. If he wishes to be but is not able, he is weaker than the cause
owing to which he is not able to be provident of things of which he is
- See also PH 2.179.