376 ///-44 to ///-45
become a cause and then brought forth the effect which is said to be
produced by it, it already being a cause. But since cause and effect are
relative, clearly it is not able to pre-exist as cause, nor can the cause, as
a cause, produce that of which it is the cause. 26. If neither being nor
not being a cause, can it produce anything, it produces nothing. Therefore,
it will not be a cause. For without producing something, the cause cannot
be conceived of as a cause.
Hence, some people say the following. The cause must either exist
simultaneously with the effect or pre-exist it or exist after the effect
occurs. To say that the cause comes to exist after the occurrence of its
effect would be ridiculous. 27. But neither is it able to exist before the
effect, for it is said to be conceived of in relation to the effect, and they
themselves say that relatives, insofar as they are relative, co-exist and are
conceived of in relation to each other. But the cause cannot co-exist with
the effect either; for if it is productive of the effect and if it is necessary
for that which comes about to be the result of something already existing,
the cause must have previously become a cause, and then have produced
its effect. Then, if the cause neither exists before its effect nor co-exists
with it, nor does
has altogether no part in existence.
- It is perhaps clear on the basis of these arguments that the concep-
tion of cause is again overturned. For if the cause, as a relative, cannot
be conceived of before its effect, yet in order to be conceived as cause
of its effect it must be conceived before its effect, and if it is impossible
to conceive of something before that before which it cannot be conceived,
then it is impossible to conceive of the cause. - From these arguments it remains for us to argue that if the reasons
we give for affirming the cause are plausible, and if it is also the case
that the reasons we set beside these for holding that it is not appropriate
to declare that there is a cause are also plausible, and if it is not possible
to prefer one set of reasons to the other, having neither a sign nor a
criterion nor a demonstration we can agree upon, as we showed before,
then it is necessary to suspend judgement about the existence of the
cause, saying that a particular cause no more exists than does not, at
least as far as what is said by the dogmatists is concerned.
Sextus M 9.218-226 [III-45]
218 .... Aenesidemus used the problems about becoming for a superior
version of them [the arguments against causality]. 219. For [on his version]
body would not be the cause of body since a body that would be the cause