Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

380 /l/-46


forth, because of the nature of this treatise, along with what appears to
us to be the [proper] judgement on them.



  1. Some say then that something can be moved in the place in which
    it is. At least, spheres revolving around their axes can be moved while
    remaining in the same place. In response to these, it is necessary to
    transfer the argument to each of the parts of the sphere, and recalling
    that as far as the argument goes, it is not moved even according to its
    parts, to infer that something is not moved in the place in which it is.

  2. We will make the same judgement against those who say that that
    which is moved has a hold on [or: is in contact with] two places, the one
    in which it is and the one into which it is carried. For we shall inquire
    of them when is that which is moved carried from the place in which it
    is into the other; is it when it is in the first place or when it is in the
    second? But when it is in the first place, it is not yet passing into the
    second, for it is still in the first. But when it is not in the first, it is not
    passing from it. 74. In addition, the very matter under investigation has
    been seized upon as settled. For in the place in which it is not, it is not
    able to act. For certainly someone will not grant that that which he does
    not concede is moving at all is being carried into some place.

  3. Some, however, say this. 'Place' has two senses, one loose, for
    example, referring to my house, and one strict, for example, the air
    pressing the surface of my body. Thus, it is said that that which is moved
    is moved in a place, but not in the strict sense of 'place' but in the
    loose sense.
    Against these, it can be said, subdividing place in the loose sense, that
    one part of it is just the place in which the aforementioned moving body
    properly is, i.e., its own place in the strict sense; and the other part is
    where it is not, that is, the rest of the 'place' in the loose sense. Then
    we infer that neither can something be moved in the place in which it
    is nor in the place in which it is not, reasoning that something cannot
    be moved in the misapplied loose sense of 'place'. For this is just made
    up of the strict sense plus the place where something is not in the strict
    sense, and it has been shown that in neither of these can something
    be moved.

  4. Further, this argument should be offered. If something is moved,
    either it is moved progressively or all at once into a divisible interval
    But something cannot be moved either progressively or all at once into
    the divisible interval, as I shall show. Therefore, it is not the case that
    something is moved.
    That it is not then possible for something to be moved progressively
    is self-evident. For if bodies and the places and times in which they are
    said to be moved are divided infinitely, motion will not occur, it being

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