Sextus Empiricus: Physics 385
possible to conceive of any other alternatives besides these, place is not
generated. And if it is neither generated nor ungenerated, it is nothing.
- These arguments can be stated more generally. If place is some-
thing, either it is a body or it is incorporeal. Each of these is doubtful,
as we have suggested. Therefore, place is doubtful. Place is thought to
be relative to the body whose place it is. But the argument for the
existence of the body is doubtful. Therefore, so is the argument for place.
The place of each thing is not everlasting, but if we say that it comes to
be, it is found to be non-existent, since coming to be does not exist.
- It is possible to say many other things, but to avoid prolonging
our discussion, the moral of the story is that while the arguments confound
the sceptics, the obviousness [of the matter] embarrasses them. Therefore,
we should not associate ourselves with either side, as far as concerns the
things said by the dogmatists, but rather suspend judgement regarding
place.
Ch. xix On Time
- We have the same impression regarding the investigation of time.
For as far as appearances are concerned, time seems to be something,
but so far as the things said about it, it appears to be non-existent. Some
say that time is the interval of the motion of the whole (by 'whole' I
mean the cosmos); some say that it is just the motion of the cosmos;
- Aristotle (or, as some say, Plato) says that it is the number of before
and after in motion; Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) says that it is the
measure of motion and rest; Epicurus says, according to Demetrius of
Laconia, that it is a property of properties, following along with days,
nights, seasons, states, absences of states, motions, and rests. 138. As to
its substance, some said that it is a body, for example, Aenesidemus and
his followers, for it does not differ from that which is, i.e., from the first
body; and some say that it is incorporeal. So, either all these positions
are true or all are false or some are true and some are false. It is not
possible that all can be true, for most of them are in conflict with each
other, nor will it be granted by the dogmatists that all are false. 139.
Moreover, if it is granted that it is false that time is body, and that it is
false that time is incorporeal, the non-existence of time will immediately
be granted, for there is no third possibility. It is not possible to grasp
which views are true and which are false, because of the equal force of
the arguments of those who disagree and the doubts about the criterion
and demonstration. 140. So, for these reasons, we shall be able to assert
nothing definite regarding time.
Further, since time does not seem to exist apart from motion, or even
without rest, if motion is abolished, and similarly rest, time is abolished.
