Hellenistic Philosophy Introductory

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

396 III-49 to III-51


recommendations are totally ineffectual, what they actually do, which is
what everybody else does, is not the peculiar product of those who are
supposed to have the craft of living. If, then, the crafts ought certainly
to be grasped from their peculiar products and there is observed to be
no peculiar product of that which is said to be the craft of living, then
it is not grasped. Therefore, no one can assert definitely regarding it that
such a craft exists.


Sextus M 11.96-98 [III-50]



  1. But in response to such puzzles some of the Epicureans are accus-
    tomed to saying that an animal flees pain and pursues pleasure naturally
    and without instruction. For when it was just born and was not yet a
    slave to matters of opinion, just as soon as it was struck by the unfamiliar
    cold air, "it wept and wailed. "^50 And if it has a natural impulse to pleasure
    and a natural avoidance of painful exertion, then by nature painful exertion
    is something which it is worth avoiding and pleasure is something natu-
    rally worth choosing. 97. Those who respond thus fail to see, first of all,
    that they are giving even the lowest of animals a share in the good, since
    they have a great share in pleasure; and next, that painful exertion is not
    something unqualifiedly worth avoiding. For one painful exertion is
    alleviated by another, and again the bodies' health, strength and nourish-
    ment are produced by painful exertions, while most men acquire crafts and
    the most accurate forms of knowledge by painful exertion. Consequently,
    painful exertion is not by nature and unconditionally something worth
    avoiding. 98. Moreover, even what seems to be pleasant is not by nature
    and unconditionally worth choosing; at any rate, things which on their
    first contact put us in a pleasurable disposition are subsequently thought
    to be unpleasant, though they are the same things; [it is] as though what
    is pleasant were not like that by nature, but rather affected us differently
    at different times, in virtue of different circumstances.


Sextus M 11.160-166 [III-51]


160 .... Therefore, he who suspends judgement about everything
which is subject to opinion reaps a harvest of the most complete happiness;



  1. he is, [to be sure,] disturbed when in the midst of involuntary and
    non-rational movements-"for he is not born of ancient oak or stone,
    but comes from the race ofmen"^51 -but is in a disposition [characterized]
    by moderation of his states [passions]. 162. Hence, he must despise those

  2. A quotation from Empedocles, B 112, adapted.

  3. Homer OdJ'SSeJ' 19.163; the last clause is Sextus' addition.

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