402 Glossary
good state [of the soul] (eupatheia): in Stoicism, a virtuous reaction by the
soul; good states are joy, caution, and wish, which correspond to the passions
pleasure, fear, and desire. The fourth passion, pain, has no rational counterpart
since the wise man is not pained (in his soul) by anything which happens in the
rational universe.
grasp: A family of terms (nouns and verbs) built on the Greek root which
means literal grasping with one's hand. antilambano and its congeners are the
most general in meaning, and are used by all schools in the Hellenistic period
for an intellectual or perceptual awareness of something real. The verb dialambano
has the sense of distinguishing clearly between things, grasping the distinctions
among things. katalambano and its congeners (katalepsis, katalepton, kataleptikon-
graspable) are used specifically in Stoicism to indicate the firm and unshakable
grasp of truths or real objects which is the foundation for all other knowledge.
A comprehensive grasp (perilambano, perilepsis) is, in Epicureanism, a complete
grasp of all the aspects or parts of something. There are two distinct categories
of things not subject to such a grasp: those which are indefinitely large or complex
(though not infinite), and a fortiori, the infinite. A basic grasp (prolepsis) is, in
Epicureanism, a fundamental concept which is virtually a given of experience,
being derived (originally unconsciously) from many experiences of the same
object. Thus a basic grasp functions importantly as a criterion for Epicurean
scientific method.
happiness (eudaimonia): the state of a human being in which it is in the best
possible condition relative to its nature; flourishing. It is not a subjective state
of personal contentment, but an objective fact about the condition of the hu-
man being.
harm (blapto, blamma): in Stoicism, restricted to moral harm, things which
hinder the life according to virtue.
honourable (honestum, kalon): in Stoicism, morally good. The Stoic doctrine
is that only what is honourable is really good; all other kinds of value are 'good'
in the sense of being preferred (q.v.).
horrnetic (hormetikon): of or concerned with an impulse (horme), as a hormetic
condition, the disposition to have a certain impulse.
image (eidolon): in Epicureanism, the effluence emitted by an object which
preserves a representation of its shape and features.
impulse (horme): the action of the soul in setting the agent in action, usually
to get or avoid something. In a rational agent it is always the result of an act of
assent, either conscious or implicit.
inaction (apraxia): the state of not being able to act. The Stoics maintained
that if, following the sceptics, one made no judgements, it would be impossible
to do anything at all, since actions required assent and judgement. The argument
from inaction was held to be a pragmatic refutation of scepticism, since it is
manifest that people do act.
indicative (endeiktikon): of signs, revealing to us something not previously per-
ceived.
indifference, indifferent (adiaphoria, adiaphoron): An indifferent thing, in
Stoic ethics, is something which does not contribute to happiness or unhappiness;