The Testimony of Cicero 57
what I could understand that good to be, if I set aside the pleasures we
get from sex, from listening to songs, from looking at [beautiful] shapes,
from smooth motions, or any other pleasures which affect any of man's
senses. Nor, indeed, can it be said that only mental rejoicing is [to be
counted] among the goods; for this is my understanding of mental rejoic-
ing: it lies in the expectation that our nature will avoid pain while acquiring
all those things I just mentioned." 42. That is exactly what he said, so
that anyone can grasp what kind of pleasure Epicurus recognizes. Then
a bit later: "I have often asked," he says, "those who are called wise,
what they would have left [to put] in the category of goods if they
removed those things-unless they were willing to emit empty sounds.
I was able to learn nothing from them. And if they wish to burble about
virtues and wisdom, they will be referring to nothing except the means
by which those pleasures which I mentioned above are produced."
Tusculan Disputations 3.47 [I-20]
The same man says that pleasure does not increase once pain is re-
moved, but that the greatest pleasure lies in not being in pain ....On Goals 1.29-33 [I-21]
29 .... First, then, he said, I will handle the subject in the manner
approved of by the founder of this school: I will settle what it is that we
are talking about and what qualities it has, not because I think that you
do not know, but so that my discourse might proceed in an orderly and
systematic fashion. So, we are asking what is the final and ultimate
good, which according to the view of all philosophers ought to be what
everything should be referred to, but which should itself be referred to
nothing else. Epicurus places this in pleasure, which he claims is the
highest good and that pain is the greatest bad thing. And the beginning
of his teaching about this is as follows.
- As soon as each animal is born, it seeks pleasure and rejoices in it
as the highest good, and rejects pain as the greatest bad thing, driving
it away from itself as effectively as it can; and it does this while it is still
not corrupted, while the judgement of nature herself is unperverted and
sound. Therefore, he says that there is no need of reason or debate about
why pleasure is to be pursued and pain to be avoided. He thinks that
these things are perceived, as we perceive that fire is hot, that snow is
white, that honey is sweet. None of these things requires confirmation
by sophisticated argumentation; it is enough just to have them pointed
out. For there is a difference between the rational conclusion of an
argument and simply pointing something out; for the former reveals