60 /-23 to /-26
Epicurean who disagrees is abandoning his case-and I know that there
are many who do so, but they are inexperienced); moreover, although
mental pleasure and pain do produce good and bad feelings, nevertheless
both of them have their origins in the body and take the body as their
point of reference; nevertheless, the pleasures and pains of the mind are
much greater than those of the body. For with the body we can perceive
nothing except what immediately affects it in the present, but with the
mind we can also perceive past and future. Even granted that when we
feel pain in the body our pain is equal [to what we feel in the mind],
still there can be a very large increase [in this pain] if we think that there
is some eternal and unlimited bad thing hanging over us. And you may
transfer the point to pleasure, so that it is greater if we are not afraid of
some such thing. 56. But this point, at any rate, is already clear, that the
greatest pleasure or annoyance in the mind makes much more difference
to the production of a blessed or wretched life than either one of them
would if they lasted an equally long time in the body. But we do not
think that pain immediately follows as soon as pleasure is removed, unless
by chance a pain should move into the place of the pleasure; on the other
hand we are delighted when pains are eliminated even if no pleasure of
the kind which stimulates the senses moves into their place; and from
this one can understand just how great a pleasure it is to be free of pain.
- But just as we are thrilled by the expectation of good things, so
too we are pleased by the recollection of good things. But fools are
tortured by the recollection of bad things, while wise men enjoy past
goods kept fresh by a grateful recollection. For it is a deeply rooted part
of human nature to bury in virtually eternal oblivion things which go
badly and to recall with satisfaction and contentment things which go
well. But when we contemplate past events with a keen and attentive
mind, then we feel distress if what we recall was bad, and joy if it was good.
On Goals 2.98 [I-24]
You have often said that no one rejoices or feels pain except because
of the body ... you deny that there is any joy in the mind which is not
referred to the body.
Tusculan Disputations 5.93-96 [I-25]
- You realize, I believe, how Epicurus divided the kinds of desires,
perhaps not in a very sophisticated fashion, but usefully at any rate.
Some are natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, some
neither [natural nor necessary]. The necessary can be satisfied with next
to nothing; for nature's riches are easily acquired. He holds that the