Short Fragments and Testimonia from Known Works 73
From book 25.^31 [1-34]
From the very beginning we have seeds which lead us, some to these
things, some to those things, and some to both; they are always [the
seeds of] actions, and thoughts and dispositions, and are greater or fewer
in number. Consequently, what we develop-such or such [actions,
thoughts, and dispositions]-is, right from the first, quite simply a result
of us; and the influences which by necessity flow from the environment
through our passages are at some point up to us and to the opinions
which come from within us ... [here there is a long lacuna].
... the natural imprint similarly to the empty pores ... of the same
peculiarities ... in every case [lacuna of about 12 words] of which the
experiences do not cease to occur ... to admonish and quarrel with each
other and try to change each other's character, as though they had in
themselves the responsibility for [their characters] and [such responsibil-
ity lay] not just in the original [condition of] the compound, and in the
necessity which comes mechanically from the environment and the influx
[of atoms]. For if one were to attribute to admonishing and being admon-
ished the mechanical necessity of what always on any occasion [happens
to] affect oneself, one would never in this way come to an understanding
[lacuna of a few words] by blaming or praising.
But if one were to do this, one would be leaving the very action which,
being in our power, creates the basic grasp of responsibility, and thereby
in some respect having changed his doctrine [long lacuna, of 45 or 50
words] of such error. For this sort of argument is upside-down and can
never prove that all things are like what are called 'necessitated events'.
But he quarrels about this very topic on the assumption that his opponent
is responsible for being foolish. And if he [goes on] indefinitely saying
again [and again], always on the basis of arguments, that he does this by
necessity, he is not reasoning it out [properly] as long as he attributes
to himself responsibility for reasoning well and to his opponent responsi-
bility for reasoning badly. But if he were not to stop [attributing responsi-
bility] for what he does to himself and [rather] to assign it to necessity,
he would not ... [lacuna of about 30 words]
[But] if he is only changing the word when he refers to what we call
"through our own [agency]" by the name of necessity and will not show
that it is in virtue of a basic grasp of a sort which produces deficient
outlines that we talk about responsibility through our own [agency], he
- Formerly thought to be from book 35. This discussion on determinism should be
compared with the discussions of the swerve above. We translate the text prepared by
David Sedley and published in his article 'Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism' in Syzetesis
(Naples 1983) 11-51.