someone wiser than himself. So he sought out the experts in various fields, but his relentless
interrogations revealed that, while these experts thought they knew something worth while, they could not
show that their “knowledge” was based on anything substantial. Socrates concluded from this that the
wisdom the Delphic god had in mind consisted simply of an understanding of one’s own intellectual
limitations, which understanding Socrates possessed to a greater degree than anyone else.
The question of what is known, or what can be known, is intimately related to the dialogue form that Plato
adopted, under the influence, presumably, of his acquaintance with Socrates: Socrates had not written
anything, apparently convinced that he knew nothing of permanent value; what Plato wrote, at least in his
earliest works, has the permanent value of presenting “Socrates” questioning the experts and
demonstrating that their expertise lacks a secure foundation. If this is how the historical Socrates spent his
time, it is easy to see why he aroused such hostility. For the experts that he interrogated were the
intellectual and political leaders whose advice was often sought, on the assumption that they had a firmer
knowledge than most people of such concepts as justice, piety, and courage. But if the experts do not
know, who does? And if the wisest man is the man who knows that he knows nothing, is there anything
that can be known for sure? Socrates and Plato undoubtedly considered these questions, but we cannot
know what answers, if any, they arrived at. In the case of Plato, however, there are at least some hints in
his dialogues of what can be known for sure.
“You know, gentlemen, to have a fear of death is nothing other than to think one is intelligent when
one is not, since it is equivalent to thinking that one knows what one does not in fact know. For no
one knows whether death might actually be the greatest of all good things for a person, and yet
people fear it as though they are quite certain that it is the greatest of evils. Is this not an instance of
that reprehensible form of ignorance, thinking that one knows what one does not in fact know? This
is perhaps another case of that disparity between me and most people; if I were to claim to be more
intelligent than someone in some regard it would be just this, that since I do not have adequate
knowledge about Hades I do not think that I have knowledge about it.” (Plato, The Apology of
Socrates 29a–b)