the new russian nationalismHutchings and Tolz, this volume), and by several regional admin-
istrations, including those of Moscow and St Petersburg. Although
in Moscow this could be ascribed to mayoral elections, there were
no elections in St Petersburg. What is significant is not just that
the police began to bring criminal charges against non- citizens far
more often,^8 but how and to what extent this was conveyed to
the public. The campaign led to an unprecedented rise in ethno-
xenophobia in society (Levada Centre 2013c).
Radical nationalists responded with their own activities, both
large- scale political events and direct action in the form of ‘raids’
(such raids were, and are to this day, conducted even by the
pro- Kremlin Motherland). The campaign was effective in pro-
moting radical nationalists in the mass media, forcing the authori-
ties to take additional steps to restrict over- zealous ‘helpers’ in
the struggle against ‘illegal migration’ (Al’perovich and Yudina
2014a). Importantly, the anti- migration campaign appeared to call
into question the declared goal of supra- ethnic political consolida-
tion, and thereby the grounds for opposing radical nationalists. It
is difficult to say whether this is the reason why the campaign was
eventually wound down by the end of autumn 2013.
However, with the beginning of the mass political mobilisa-
tion against the West and the ‘Kiev junta’ (the new authorities
in Ukraine after the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych), the impact
of the anti- migrant campaign was completely smoothed over.
The new propaganda campaign led to maximum political con-
solidation around the Kremlin, to the detriment of nationalist
ideas: in spring 2014 ethno- xenophobia declined sharply, as did
support for ethnic nationalist slogans, including slogans about
the need for introducing a visa regime for citizens of Central
Asian countries (Romanov and Stepanov 2014). One may, of
course, question the specific data collated in response to these
or other surveys, but there can be no doubt that, for the major-
ity of the population, the foreign policy conflict and patriotic
enthusiasm connected with the annexation of Crimea eclipsed
the previous year’s priorities for some time. As of the time of
this writing (summer 2014–winter 2015), the theme of political
unity has again come to dominate the discourse of the authori-
ties and those groups loyal to them, only now in a more militant