the new russian nationalismorganisation. In any case, the use of violence is very important for
radical nationalists – a fact they do not attempt to hide, judging
from their enthusiasm for public lessons in knife fighting, para-
military gatherings and the like.
Under serious police pressure, the level of racist and neo- Nazi
violence began to fall from 2009 onwards, while violence against
political opponents (as opposed to ‘aliens’ and the homeless),
began to decline two or so years later. This shift may be explained
by a certain disillusionment among militant groups with their
usual practice of racist attacks. Simply put, they have gradually
come to realise that beatings, even murders, of ‘aliens’ have no
impact on the pace of migration or on government policies, or
even on public opinion – such methods will not bring the ‘white
revolution’ any nearer. However, it would be erroneous to see
their goals as simply the venting of personal xenophobic emotions
and hooligan tendencies, as this sector also has a fully defined
political aim (‘Podlinnaia istoriia.. .’ n.d.).
Political terror is a more effective method of radicalising the
Russian majority, and this argument is essentially the one used
by members of the People’s Will (Narodovoltsy) (RAC 14 2008).
That said, it is almost impossible to find groups that could organ-
ise serious attacks on representatives of the authorities: such
activity involves a higher degree of risk, and – even more chal-
lenging – a greater facility for conspiracy. Despite idle talk of
the attractions of terrorism, this method of revolutionising the
masses has not advanced significantly enough to instil optimism
in radical nationalists.
Since at least 2002, efforts have been made to turn criminal
incidents – the participants of which are described in ethnic
terms (‘Russians’ or ‘non- Russians’) – into local disturbances
with the potential for wider revolutionary development. Since
the riots in Kondopoga in 2006, there have been multiple efforts
to deploy this same scenario – several each year – and national-
ists have not yet abandoned this tactic.^9 Occasionally, riots are
pulled off, whether with the participation of nationalist activists
or not. More often, however, the ‘Kondopoga technique’ fails to
work. By 2009 the enthusiasm that Kondopoga generated among
radical nationalists had faded notably. Even where disturbances