the new russian nationalismTo some extent, the explanation may lie in the simple fact that
all activists have been very occupied with the events unfolding
in Ukraine. Although the thesis that Russian nationalists were
simply ‘hypnotised by the screen’ seems inadequate, the degree to
which this holds true testifies to the less than impressive political
quality of the movement.
Police pressure has also played a part. The arrest of Bondarik
(and the earlier house arrest of Evtushenko) notably reduced
the activity of radical nationalists in the more dynamic St
Petersburg, where – in contrast to Moscow – the practice of
combining political and violent action had become firmly estab-
lished. Just how easily repression can control radical nationalist
structures indicates how unprepared for effective action they
actually are.
Thus, even in the favourable conditions of 2013 the radical
nationalist movement demonstrated only very weak signs of
growth. This had also been the case up to December 2011,
when they clearly dominated the opposition; and in the period in
which they participated in a wider social movement in 2012. Any
growth has been primarily a matter of geographic spread. There
has been almost no research on the makeup of activist groups
in various towns across Russia, but it may be assumed that the
‘Russian March’ and ‘Russian May Day’ attract the same sorts
of groups in the new towns as in the old. The radical nationalists
have not managed to qualitatively expand support for their move-
ment.^25 There are at least three reasons – other than pressure from
the authorities – for this.
First, youth groups inclined towards violence still provide the
grassroots and mass membership of the movement. It is spe-
cifically these groups, visibly characterising the ‘Russian March’,
which remain the face of Russian nationalism in the eyes of the
public. Statistically, there is good reason for this. In terms of style,
this sort of political force is not compatible with the moderate
ethno- xenophobic inclinations of the general public.
Second, the most successful radical nationalist methods thus
far have been diverse types of ‘Kondopogas’, ‘Manezhnaia riots’
and ‘Russian cleansing’ – but such disturbances definitely do not
generate public sympathy. Most people respond badly – or at