the new russian nationalismidentity among individuals facing a collective action problem
(see Hale 2008: 62–80). With regard to the central question of
this study, that would entail a defection from ethnic minority
groups or the weakening of minority group loyalty and claim-
ing a stronger loyalty to the majority group within a state under
uncertainty about the effects of Russia’s territorial expansion on
intergroup relations.
The instrumentalist approach also yields mutually exclusive
predictions regarding support for incorporating both Slavic and
non- Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union into some form
of Russian dominion (most plausibly, a Eurasian Union or a
reformed Commonwealth of Independent States – a USSR 2.0, so
to speak). The threat to group position theory may, on the one
hand, predict that ethnic minorities would oppose such an expan-
sion, fearing more intense intra- minority group competition. With
more minorities in the Russian domain, minority group competi-
tion for the second- best status is likely to increase. In research on
immigration and conflict this logic plays out when the most hostile
responses toward immigrants come not from the ethnic major-
ity group in a receiving state, but from ethnic minorities whose
proportion in the population is just above the estimated propor-
tion of ethnic minorities represented by migrants (Bergesen and
Herman 1998). This competition would be enhanced by minority
elites vying to be ‘the most favoured lords’ – a privileged status
giving them greater access to the central government (for example,
Moscow) and more protected ‘lordship’ in minority- populated
regions than that enjoyed by other minority elites (Laitin 1991).
The institutional legacies of the ‘most favoured lord’ politics have
been pronounced in the post- Soviet area (Cooley 2005).
On the other hand, the instrumentalists could also predict the
opposite, if they feel that the privileged position of the dominant
ethnic Russians (and Slavs) would be reduced in a larger entity
and minority groups may form alliances among each other to
increase their bargaining position vis-à- vis the majority on spe-
cific issues. From this standpoint, Russia’s incumbent ethnic
minorities may value the opportunity to form coalitions with
other minorities versus the majority more than they may fear
the cost of competing with other minorities, as the majority con-